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Introduction 
The Asian financial crisis started in Thailand in 1997 and reached almost every country 
in Asia, thereby bringing about a great socio-economic impact on the countries of this 
region. The rapid increase in mass unemployment and the consequential increase in 
poverty following the financial crisis were among the most challenging policy tasks for 
these countries. The number of unemployed increased dramatically in such countries as 
South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, which were highly praised as successful cases of 
rapid economic development, yet in which the number of unemployed increased by 
about 0.9 million, 0.7 million and 1.4 million1  respectively from 1997 to 1998.  
 Although it is true that these countries have maintained a good track record of low 
unemployment compared to other parts of the world over the last two decades, they 
have not been immune to the problems of unemployment. Malaysia suffered from high 
unemployment during the period between 1986 and 1988, as did South Korea in the 
early 1980s, and the governments responded to those problems with a wide range of 
measures (Table 1).  
                                                 
1 The figure for Thailand includes both the open and the passively unemployed, 13 years of age and 
above, who were available for work but did not work at all. The open unemployed increased from 0.14 
million in 1997 to 0.46 million to 1998. The official unemployment rate of 3.2 and 3.4 percent in both 
1998 and 1999 (see Table 1) for Malaysia masked the accumulated number of the unemployed just after 
the financial crisis since it was estimated at a certain point in time after the implementation of counter-
unemployment policy which will be explained later. 
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Table 1. Trends of Unemployment Rate in Selected Asian Countries 
  ‘80 82  84 86 88 90 92 94 96 97 98 99 ‘00 
Hong Kong  3.8 3.6 3.9 2.8 1.4 1.3 2 1.9 2.8 2.2 4.7 6.2 4.9 
Indonesia        2.7 2.8 2.5 2.7 4.4 4.9 4.7 5.5 6.4 6.1 
Japan 2 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 
South Korea  5.2 4.4 3.8 3.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 
Malaysia     5.8 8.3 7.2 5.1 3.7 3 2.5 2.4 3.2 3.4 3.1 
Philippines 4.8 5.5 7 6.4 8.3 8.1 8.6 8.4 7.9 9.6 9.4 10.1 9.8 
Singapore  3 2.6 2.7 6.5 3.3 1.7 2.7 2.6 3 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.1 
Taiwan       2.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 3 
Thailand 0.8 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 4.4 4.2 3.6 
Source : IMF World Economic Outlook . ILO LABORSTA. http://laborsta.ilo.org. Dept. of Labour, and 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia (BPS, Sakernas Survey, 1997–2000). OECD Main Economic 
Indicators. National Statistical Office, the Philippines, Integrated Survey of Households, Manila, NSO. 
Thailand: Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No.01/155 (August 2001). 
http://www.mom.gov.sg. http://www.info.gov.hk/hkecon/labour/index.htm 
Table 2. Unemployment in Malaysia and South Korea 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
MA 8,257 8,641 9,038 8,849 9,178 9,573 9,892 Labour Force 
(thousand) 
KO 20,853 21,243 21,662 21,456 21,634 21,950 22,181 
MA 256.0 216.0 216,9 277.0 308.2 301.3 357.0 the Number of the 
Unemployed 
(Thousand) KO 420 426 556 1,461 1,353 889 819 
MA 3.1 2.5 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.6 Unemployment Rate 
(%) 
KO 2.0 2.0 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 3.7 
Source: the Ministry of Finance (each year), Economic Report , Kuala Lumpur, the Ministry of Finance, 
Malaysia. The National Statistics Office, Survey on Economically Active Population, Seoul, the National 
Statistics Office.  
How have the governments of these rapidly growing economies responded to their 
unemployment problems? Have their policies shared a certain pattern related to their 
rapid economic growth?  
In order to address these questions Malaysia and South Korea are singled out for 
several reasons. First, they were typical examples of rapid economic growth in the NIEs 
and the so-called second generation of NIEs in South East Asia before the Financial 
Crisis. Until the financial crisis they had showed a good performance on the 
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management of macroeconomic imbalance while avoiding widening income inequality 
and reducing absolute poverty relatively well compared to other developing countries. 
In particular these two countries’ performances on the stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes in the 1980s, which had no adverse effect on employment and 
poverty, were widely hailed as successful cases (Azizur Rahman Khan, 1994: 22). 
Secondly, they were the ones amongst countries which have suffered the highest 
unemployment rates with outstanding records of reducing an unexpectedly high 
magnitude of unemployment in a short time span. Malaysia maintained its 
unemployment rate at more or less 3 percent after the financial crisis (Ministry of 
Finance, 2000) while Korea, where the unemployment rate reached a record high at 6.8 
percent in 1998, soon recovered to 3.7 % in 2001 (the NSO, 2002) (See Table 2). 
Thirdly, both countries have been praised as examples of successful cases of state 
interventionist economic management. Korea, as one of the «four little tigers», has been 
known as a typical case of a developmental state and Malaysia, as one of the second 
generation of emerging Asian economies, has been considered as the most enthusiastic 
emulator of the developmental state (Lubeck 1992: 177).  
These two countries, however, also have various contrasting points (Edwards 1996: 
312–3). First, they have quite different natural endowments, which made a significant 
difference in their industrialisation processes. Secondly, they have quite different 
colonial experiences, which significantly affected their industrial structure and 
educational systems. Thirdly, the geo-political situation of South Korea differs 
considerably from that of Malaysia and this determined the land reform process, aid, 
rural–urban and agriculture–industry relations. Fourthly, while Korea has been on the 
track of democratisation since 1987, Malaysia is still considered a «semi-democracy» 
synthesising both elements of political liberalism without full democracy (dictablanda) 
and democratic procedures without liberalization (democradura) (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986: 6–14, Case 1993a: 186). Last but not least, the ethnic profile is 
significantly different between the two countries; while ethnic division is deeply 
entrenched in Malaysia, South Korea is very much homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. 
Given their similarities and contrasts, these countries provide interesting cases for 
the analysis of the pattern of unemployment policies of a rapidly growing economy. 
How have these rapidly growing economies formed and developed the unemployment 
policies and what is the nature of these policies? What is the nature of the relationship 
between the unemployment policy and the economic growth? How have they been 
changed within the context of economic globalisation? Are they converging or 
diverging? Answering these questions will provide us with important insights for the 
understanding of social policy development in late developing countries. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Policy measures for unemployment comprise a complex set of programmes to prevent 
or counteract the undesirable socio-economic, political and psychological consequences 
of unemployment. These policies have been classified into two kinds of social science: 
the economic intervention and the social intervention of the government. 
The government’s economic intervention through monetary, fiscal and wages-
income policies is based on the belief that appropriate macro economic management 
could prevent or at least minimise unemployment. Although this belief gained currency 
through the elaborate theorisation of demand-side management by J.M. Keynes and his 
school, the idea of government intervention into the market to prevent unemployment 
had already been prevalent in some European countries such as the UK before Keynes 
(Rowntree 1923).  
Social intervention of the government is based on the idea of the state’s 
responsibility to alleviate the sufferings of the unemployed through public welfare 
provision. This state responsibility has been the core of the welfare state. The 
introduction of the «social right» dimension into citizenship led the state to establish 
various normative principles of modern welfare states (Marshall and Bottomore 1992) 
and to tackle a variety of problems resulting from the market failure without a 
significant degree of distortion of the market. Obviously one of the major problems was 
unemployment, as Beveridge rightly pointed out. The government established various 
programmes of social intervention aiming at mitigating the worst consequences of 
unemployment through employment creating measures such as public job creation, job 
maintenance subsidies and vocational training, and income compensation measures such 
as unemployment insurance benefits or public assistance in cash and kind designed to 
guarantee a stable livelihood.  
Well known concepts such as the Keynesian welfare state/Schumpetarian workfare 
state, passive/active labour market policies and welfare-to-work or workfare were 
conceptualised to describe and explain various programmes of the government’s 
intervention to counteract unemployment in both normative and practical senses. 
Recent debate between the old and new, or, to put it bluntly, the defenders and 
attackers of the welfare state, dealing with a wide range of issues from social right to 
efficient allocation of resources, mostly drew on these typologies as their conceptual 
framework.  
Despite numerous analytical benefits offered by these typologies or «characteristic 
forms» many issues remain unresolved. First, there are definitional problems. Workfare 
or welfare-to-work, as Kildal (2001: 1) rightly put it, is so vaguely and broadly 
conceptualised that important distinctions and normative issues such as differing extents 
of reciprocal obligation and policy implications of different activities in different 
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countries may not be presented as discernable forms. This is also the case for active 
labour market policies. Active labour market is an umbrella concept indicating a wide 
range of policy measures except traditional benefit provision (i.e. passive labour market 
policies), which is too broadly defined to discern the different implications contained in 
welfare to work or workfare. Secondly, there is the problem of presupposition of 
income maintenance welfare programmes. Discussions on the unemployment policies 
drawing on those typologies are more often than not based on the presence of the 
welfare state in the most residual sense, that is, the explicit public attempt to alleviate 
poverty as a social right (Goodin 1998: 6). The conceptual framework of these 
typologies presupposes that the welfare state’s efforts transform or shift the emphasis 
from the benefit-based approach to the active labour market approach, particularly for 
workfare programmes. This suggests a potential pitfall in the application of these 
conceptual frameworks to some countries which do not have a specific programme for 
the unemployed to qualify them as  «welfare states». Given the fact that in Asia there are 
only four countries which have such programmes for the unemployed2 , the explanatory 
power of those frameworks is limited.  
These problems arose from the assumption underlying those conceptual tools that 
policy attempts to alleviate or correct the consequences of market failure, particularly 
unemployment, can only be found in the dimension of redistribution activities of the 
public policy. However the policy attempt to alleviate the consequences of market 
failure or correct the market failure, in other words the policy to protect social security, 
can be made in other dimensions of public policy, i.e. those activities of efficiency and 
stabilisation of the public policy (Musgrave 1959, Boadway 1997: 754–755).  
The recognition of the presence of multiple dimensions of the unemployment 
policies helps us to understand the different aspects of the unemployment problems. As 
we can see in the multiple dimensions of the unemployment policies, unemployment 
itself has qualitatively different kinds of consequences. As an attempt to enhance our 
understanding of unemployment, we suggest three dimensions of security pertaining to 
unemployment which are faced by both workers and the unemployed.  
Both the employed and unemployed anticipate or experience at least three 
dimensions of security loss to differing degrees depending on their socio-economic 
conditions. First of all, the loss of the income security which the programmes of the 
benefit-based approach had aimed to protect can be perceived very differently by 
individuals. Those who can rely on other family members may feel the income loss less 
painfully than those without families or a breadwinner. The breadwinners’ 
unemployment could bring about a dire situation for the whole household and he or she 
is more likely to suffer the income loss than those with other family members they can 
rely on. For a poor household with a disproportionately high number of the very young 
and old dependents, what is urgently needed may be income transfers rather than job 
training or job provision programmes (Varisa 1980: 202).  
                                                 
2 According to the ILO report as of 1998 only four Asian countries – China, Mongolia, South Korea and 
Hong Kong, China had any form of unemployment benefit scheme. See 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pkits/wlr2000/wlr00ch3.htm.  
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The unemployment of single mothers on welfare was a hotly debated issue in the 
United States in the 1990s. The work requirement or workfare condition of AFDC was 
established upon the premise that single mothers on welfare benefits can get jobs and 
those jobs could provide them with adequate earnings to support families. The study 
shows that two assumptions are groundless (McCrate and Smith 1998). The availability 
of jobs for single mothers was very limited, and the single mother’s employment did not 
provide them with adequate earnings, that is, earnings sufficient to pay for basic 
necessities. To them a protection for job security is not a long-term solution for income 
loss unless there is a fundamental change in the market condition. For single mothers 
sufficient income security to keep them out of poverty is more needed than job security, 
since this conditions their access to work (Gray 2001: 200)3 . Grover and Stewart (1999) 
clearly show how both the British Conservative government of the early 1990s and the 
current Labour government threatened the income security of single mothers by 
following an employment-based approach in which they deliberately engineered 
downward pressure on wages through the provision of in-work benefits.  
The structure of the welfare provision system also significantly affects the income 
consequences of the unemployed. In a country where workers can benefit from basic 
welfare services, such as health, housing, education and pensions from companies, 
unemployment may be detrimental to their livelihood. These workers suffer larger post-
unemployment standard of living declines than workers who are provided with basic 
welfare services under the universalist type welfare system (encompassing the entire 
population regardless of employment records). For those workers protected by an 
occupational welfare-centred welfare system, unemployment means a loss of welfare 
security as well as income security. Gaining jobs without such welfare services packages 
does not guarantee the standard of living they used to have. Thus employment security 
does not necessarily guarantee welfare security. On the contrary in a country where the 
welfare provisions are universal, and not attached to employment, the unemployed 
could endure the income consequences of unemployment more easily than those in a 
country where an employment related welfare provision system is prevalent. To these 
people, income security may be more important than employment security. 
The job security, which the programmes in the employment-based approach are 
aimed to protect, also entails different implications to individuals. The nature of 
unemployment consequences and the needs of the British miners in the late 1970’s may 
be somewhat different from those in the information technology industries. The laid-off 
miners who could not find jobs in the declining mining industry lost the opportunity to 
use their skills, knowledge and experience (accumulated human capital), as well as their 
income. They were forced to take up jobs in other trades, which would provide them 
with less wages than they used to have. The guarantee of job security in another trade 
cannot satisfy their needs for the employment security in their own trade. The case of 
Swedish active labour market policies shows how the workers perceive the guarantee of 
                                                 
3 Gray points out that the access to work is also contingent on the availability of child-caring-friendly jobs 
for mothers. ibid. 200. 
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job security differently. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Swedish economy 
went through an industrial restructuring stage. Facing the risk of the collapse of the 
companies, Swedish workers made a strong demand for the security of employment at 
the existing place of work. The flexibility of the labour force had already been greatly 
reduced in the course of increasing house ownership and working wives. They did not 
want to have a job in other areas where jobs in other trades were guaranteed but to 
retain their employment (Henning 1984: 207–8). The government did not pursue the 
protection of job security but of employment security by supporting companies which 
had been widely known as being on the brink of collapse. The main purpose of this 
policy was not to protect the job security but the employment security. The industrial 
policy consideration for the structurally correct adaptation and long term profitability 
also played a significant role in choosing the security of employment rather than job 
security on the labour market.  
From the above discussion, three dimensions of security emerge; job security, 
income security and employment security. Job security is guaranteed when the policy 
facilitates the entrance of the unemployed or the transfer of workers from one trade to 
another. Employment security is guaranteed when the policy protects the accumulated 
human capital and social capital of workers. Income security is guaranteed when the 
policy provides the recipients without compulsion on the recipients to work.  
Apart from these three dimensions of security, in order to enhance our 
understanding of unemployment policy we need to analyse the dimensions of security 
on at least two levels: recipients and providers. To identify the dimensions of the 
security threat or loss which both the employed and the unemployed experience is one 
thing and to explain the nature of the policy response is another. The fact that the 
political management of the unemployment problem by Mrs Thatcher in the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, in which the unemployment issue was placed in a different order of 
priority, clearly shows the importance of the problems of recognition, interpretation and 
policy design (Henning and Richardson 1984: 4). To look at how those problems were 
recognised and interpreted by the policy authority is as important as what those 
problems really were.  
Here we will only focus on the question of which security goal has been given 
priority in the policy choices and which dimension policy measures of both countries 
have actually been protected.  
We divide the following section into two, one part each for Malaysia and Korea. 
Each section will be periodised reflecting the country’s socio-economic and political 
development. Given the significance of the Asian Financial Crisis, the year 1997 will be 
set as a distinctive point to compare both continuities and discontinuities in policy 
response to unemployment in both sections.  
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Malaysian Policy responses to 
Unemployment  
Development of Social  and Labour Pol icy 
Under Brit ish Colonial  Rule  
During the colonial rule the British colonial government responded to the shortage of 
labour in the tin and rubber industries by allowing neighbouring Chinese and Indians to 
migrate to the Malaysian peninsular. While Malay aristocrats enjoyed better political and 
socio-economic status as civil servants under the British colonial policy of indirect rule, 
most indigenous people, Malays (or Bumiputera in Malay terms), led a poor life 
dependent on the agriculture of paddy rice. Although to a very limited extent, social 
policy and labour policy were established within this colonial context.  
One of the most serious challenges to colonial government was the increasing labour 
movement during the 1930s. Malaysia together with Myanmar had the most advanced 
labour movement in South East Asia during the 1930s (Thomson 1947). After the 
Trade Union Bill was passed in 1940, trade unions began to emerge in the tin and 
rubber industries, and union members were almost entirely Chinese in character, in 
membership and particularly in leadership, organised by the Malayan Communist Party 
(Gamba 1958: 118). However this labour movement was gradually declining under the 
British colonial government’s dual policy to counter the Communists’ bid to control 
labour from the late 1940s. On the one hand the British government directly and 
indirectly involved itself in the labour organisation and tried to develop «democratic and 
responsible unions» (Parmer 1955: 33). On the other they took a stern stance against the 
communist attempts to control labour (Thomson 1951). The strong counteraction of 
the British reached its peak in 1948 when the British government declared an 
Emergency Regulation to quell violent communist revolts. The impact of the 
Emergency Regulation was so detrimental to the emerging labour movement that a third 
of trade unions ceased to function and most trade union leaders fled to the jungle. 
Since 1950, the labour movement regained strength under British guidance. In 1951 
the Malay Trade Union Congress (MTUC) was established and its membership 
increased rapidly from only 43,000 in 1951 to about 121,000 in the Federation and 
68,000 in Singapore (Gamba 1954: 28).  
The establishment of two major employers organisations, the Malayan Mining 
Employers’ Association (MMEA) in 1946 and the Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers’ Association (MPIEA) in 1947 marked a new beginning for industrial 
relations by opening collective bargaining on the Malaysian peninsula. However the 
issues dealt with during the collective bargaining process were very limited and the 
employers dominated the collective bargaining process.  
Social welfare programmes were established within this dual labour policy context. 
Before the Second World War the basic welfare to workers, such as hospitals and state 
schools, were provided by the employers of large plantations and mining companies. In 
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1940 when the British Colonial Development and Welfare Policy was established, this 
direct welfare provision by employers was changed to an indirect one through taxation 
on the employer (Benson 1943: 392–3). After the Second World War the colonial 
government extended this health care provision to rural areas as part of the overall 
development policies and as a strategic measure to counter Communist insurgency. 
(Barraclough 1998: 54) 
The Employees Provident Fund (Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekeja) was established 
under these circumstances in 1951 under the general direction of social policy for the 
British colonies of the British Actuary’s Department4 .  
It was a compulsory saving scheme primarily for the security to its members for old 
age retirement. Both employers and employees were supposed to contribute 5% of the 
employees’ wage, and members could withdraw this money when they retired5 . The 
majority of the Fund’s members were Chinese and Indian salaried and waged workers 
who were more familiar with the rotating credit associations’ regular contributory and 
lump sum withdrawal elements than the insurance type protection scheme (Ardener 
1964). Since it was a benefit scheme for the employees’ retirement, the purchase of 
housing and medical services, it did not have an element to provide benefits to the 
unemployed. Chinese and Indian workers in the tin and rubber industries did not care 
much about unemployment benefits since they would eventually return to their home 
countries where they had dependents, as many of them did during periods of depression 
(Kleinsorge 1957: 158)  
Although there were some improvements in working conditions through the 
legislation of the Weekly Holiday Act of 1950 and the expansion of the Labour Code, 
workers did not have a good standard of living. Although there was a demand from the 
MTUC for elementary social services, more education, decent housing, early fulfilment 
of the Employment Code and educational courses in trade union organisations, these 
demands for social security measures were rejected outright by the Legislative Council 
(Thomson 1951).  
The British colonial government was only concerned with workers employed by the 
British employers, and the abundant unemployed people who came to urban area for 
jobs were not perceived as a problem but as a good business condition, as long as they 
did not cause serious social disorder.  
In 1955 the legislature was transformed from a fully appointive body to a majority of 
elected positions; the Alliance party, composed of the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian 
Indian Congress (MIC), took over the legislature and had decision making power to a 
certain degree, under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Rahman. This was a marriage of 
                                                 
4 For the British Colonial Office’s influence on the design of the welfare provision system in British 
colonies, see Leonard P. Fletcher (1976) «The Provident Fund Approach to Social Security in the 
Eastern Caribbean», JSP: 17. 
5 The Singaporean Central Provident Fund, established two years later than the EPF, had a similar system 
and contribution rate of employers and employees, 5% of employee’s monthly wage for both employers 
and employees. See Kwon 1998 and Tremewan 1998.  
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convenience between the Malay upper class and Chinese and Indian capitalists who 
accrued wealth during their stay on the peninsular.  
From Independence to the Malays Racial  
Riot (1957–1969) 
Since gaining independence in 1957, the social tensions between Malays and non-Malays 
(Chinese and Indians) arising out of economic injustice have been among the most 
serious problems in the ethnically plural society of Malaysia. The poverty, widespread 
among Malays who were relatively low educated, rural based and unemployed compared 
to non-Malays, should be addressed as soon as possible (Visaria 1980). Under these 
circumstances, the alliance government considered industrialisation as the best solution, 
and overseas investment was seen as the answer (Runder 1973: 30). The national 
economic growth was thought to save the poor Malays from poverty through 
employment in newly expanded industries. An economic growth strategy, rather than a 
redistributive strategy, was the policy chosen to enhance the welfare of the Malays. 
The government took their first industrial initiative, the Pioneer Industries Scheme, 
in 1957. Under the Scheme, member companies were provided with favourable tax 
treatment and other incentives. Through this industrialisation plan the government 
pursued a specific employment policy to protect the Malays’ job security. The 
government demanded an employment quota in which a certain percentage of 
employees working for the companies of the Pioneer Industry Scheme should be Malays 
as a condition for the recognition of Pioneering Industry status. The government 
employment policy was very much interventionist with a strong ethnic flavour. It was 
generally agreed that this government policy was not very effective in terms of reduction 
of Malay unemployment and poverty, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, there was too 
much migration of Malays from rural areas to urban areas. The jobs newly created in the 
pioneer industry were not enough for those migrant Malays. The increase of jobs in 
developing sectors such as building and construction also simply could not cope with 
the rapid increase of rural Malay migrants, which made Malaysia the most highly 
urbanised nation in South East Asia in the 1960s (Sendut 1966: 484–5). Secondly, there 
was an informal but very systematic barrier against the Malay’s entry into Chinese or 
Indian owned firms.  
The Malays who became employed did not enjoy a high standard of living either. The 
government called on workers to accept reduced wages in order to attract overseas 
investment. Although there was a strong demand for a statutory minimum ‘living wage’ 
from the opposition party, the government, preoccupied with the priority of attracting 
of overseas investment, rejected it outright (David 1962: 941–3, 945–6, quoted in 
Rudner 1973: 35).  
As the industrialisation process continued, wage stability became one of the main 
goals of the labour policy. Emerging trade unionism in the tin, rubber and 
transportation industries was suppressed in this context and the repression reached its 
peak in 1959 when the Trade Union Ordinance was established. Under the Ordinance, 
labour organisations should be organised along the line of occupation or trade, and the 
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government had the authority to check over trade union finance and to investigate their 
internal affairs. It was a significant obstacle to the emerging trade unions, still 
decentralised and powerless.  
The wage issue was significant in a practical sense since the Federal government was 
the country’s largest single employer of manual labour6 . The government not only 
maintained low wages for employees of government owned companies but also tried to 
compel other private companies to conform to the government’s income policy.  
The government response to unemployment was in line with their industrialisation 
policy. Although there was cyclical and seasonal unemployment, the government 
considered it as a result of population growth which would be resolved through 
economic expansion (Addresses by Minister of Commerce and Industry, L.C./D.R. 
Proc., 11 July, 1956, col.1355; and Prime Minister, 30 November 1959, col. 657–8 
quoted in Rudner, 1973, 36). Thus they did not establish a specific unemployment 
policy other than the employment policy for Malays. There was no manpower planning 
and no policy goal to maintain full employment. As Rudner rightly pointed out, the 
industrialisation, ‘originally conceived as a means of absorbing unemployment was 
transformed into a goal of the policy, which precluded the maintenance of short-term 
full employment. It was a policy of inaction, a policy of «no-artificially-maintained levels 
of employment’ (Rudner 1973: 36).  
As the tin and rubber industries had a cyclical recession in the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s the seasonal or cyclical unemployment became a social problem. The trade 
unions and opposition parties strongly demanded a full-employment policy and the 
establishment of an unemployment benefits system. The federal government responded 
to this with a policy to create some relief work projects. However this relief work was 
not provided in the hard-hit tin and rubber areas since the government, focusing on 
industrialisation rather than on the maintenance of full employment, feared that such 
work projects could redeploy labour away from their normal employers (Rudner 1973: 
36).  
The government was still preoccupied with the idea of subordinating labour to the 
general industrialisation plan even under the relatively good economic conditions. In 
1963 although acknowledging the high unemployment, the Prime Minister still argued 
that economic growth under the Second Five Year Plan would solve the problem 
(Prime Minister, D. R. Proc., 23, May 1963, col. 126, Rudner 1973: 36).  
Although there was not a much progress in terms of the organisation rate of the 
trade unions7 , the confrontation with Indonesia over territorial conflict provided the 
trade unions a good opportunity to enhance their bargaining position in early 1963. In 
order to mobilise workers, the government took a much softer stance against the labour 
                                                 
6 In 1957 the Federal government’s employees (excluding the armed forces, municipalities and public 
enterprises) accounted for about 5% of the total labour force (2,126,182 ). This compared to 614,000 in 
the rubber industry.  
7 By the end of 1962 only about a quarter of the non-peasant labour force was organised in trade unions. 
See International Labour Office (1962) The Trade Union Situation in the Federation of Malaya. Geneva: ILO: 
33. 
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in many sectors of industry, particularly in the railway service industries, and the 
government even increased the wages and fringe benefits of workers in the railway 
service industry. It is notable that although there was no legislation on the national 
minimum wage the government made implicit a bottom line of wages by directly 
ordering east coast employers to increase wages (Rudner 1973: 43).  
However the government’s moderate stance did not last long and repressions of 
labour became severe as the territorial conflict died down. New restrictions on the trade 
unions were established, and these measures were formally institutionalised in the 1967 
Industrial Relations Act.  
The government’s effort to promote national industrialisation mostly concentrated 
on import-substitution (IS) industries. Responding to the government efforts, net 
output in the IS manufacturing sector in Malaysia grew rapidly from 9 percent of the 
total GDP in 1960 to 13 percent in 1970, and manufacturing employment grew from 
6.4 percent of total employment in 1957 to 11.4 percent in 1970 as the manufacturing 
sector grew  (Hoffman and Tan 1980, Appendix AII. 1).  
However the nature of government support prevented further growth of 
manufacturing employment (Standing 1996: 41). The government support concentrated 
on the business of assembly, packaging and final processing of finished goods – 
previously imported from abroad for the domestic market. Those industries had weak 
links with the rest of the national economy which could have generated employment 
capacity.  
The government’s policy could not generate the incentive for skill development. 
Under the highly effective protection for import substituting industries, companies 
merely packaging and assembling imported components for sale in the domestic market 
could make high profits as long as they had abundant manual workers. They were under 
no pressure to learn technology or skills (Jomo and Edwards 1993: 24). 
The industrialisation pace was slackened after the mid-1960s because of the domestic 
market saturation, and the contribution of manufacturing to the GDP remained small, 
at around 9 per cent in both 1960 and 1964 (World Bank 1983: 6). The low capacity of 
industries to absorb the labour force was another problem of ISI and the 
unemployment figure reached about 8.0% in 1970.  
Despite a certain degree of economic growth thanks to foreign direct investment 
during the IS industrialisation drive, income inequalities increased especially among 
Malays and poverty remained widespread (Pang 1983: 317). This was one of the major 
factors for the reduction of support for the ruling alliance coalition and its worst 
electoral performance ever in the 1969 general election, and it led to ethnic clashes on 
13 May 19698 . Although these took place only in Kuala Lumpur, the Malay authorities 
received a great shock since the clashes were due to the discontent of urban Malays who 
                                                 
8 The proximate cause of the Kuala Lumpur riots was the rude taunting of Malay bystanders by Chinese and Indian 
celebrants during an opposition victory parade. The underlying reasons for the transformation of petty brawl into 
subsequent virulent racial riot were Malay dissatisfaction with the slow pace of their economic improvement, anger 
at the non-Malay challenge to the primacy of the Malay political leadership, and frustration at the non-fulfilment of 
Malay cultural aspirations. Stephen Chee (1974) «Malaysia and Singapore: The Political Economy of Multiracial 
Development», Asian Survey, 14 (2, A Survey of Asia in 1973): Part II.  
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were the major constituent of the government. The racial riot gave the government an 
urgent message that they needed a new strategy for the Malays. 
The NEP: Economic Growth through Racial  
Economic Balance  
To alleviate the discontent of the Malays, the government under the leadership of Tun 
Razak, the leader of the Barisan Nasional (BN), the enlarged coalition government with 
a merger of several opposition parties, launched the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
which coincided with the government’s Second Malaysia Plan (1971–1975).  
The NEP had two proclaimed objectives. Firstly, «to reduce and eventually eradicate 
poverty irrespective of race» and secondly, «to restructure Malaysian society to correct 
economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race 
with economic function» (Second Malaysia Plan 1971–1975: 1–10). The establishment 
of the NEP therefore showed that the government emphasis shifted from a general 
economic growth policy with supplementary affirmative programmes for Malays to the 
enhancement of the Malays’ economic status. They believed that once the racial 
imbalances of economic well-being were evened out through the NEP, the economic 
growth would be guaranteed (Chee 1974: 183).  
The policies which the government implemented to eradicate poverty and restructure 
Malaysian society were based on the idea that the poverty of the Malays was due to their 
high concentration in rural areas, marked by high unemployment and low productivity, 
and low concentration in the higher income commercial and industrial sectors (Mehden 
1975: 254). Therefore policies aimed at restructuring the labour market in order to 
increase the representation of Malays in the non-agricultural sector were established. In 
addition, policies were established to improve the poor quality of life of the village poor 
and to motivate peasants to work harder through the provision of basic amenities 
(Mehmet 1982: 978, Shamsul 1983: 465). In particular, programmes were launched to 
provide and improve basic amenities in rural areas (involving the construction of village 
mosques, bus sheds, bicycle paths and community halls, road reconstruction, provision 
of piped water, electricity, low-cost housing, postal and telecommunication service, 
health facilities, and so forth) to reduce the underemployment and unemployment in 
these areas. Racial quotas for employment at all levels (i.e. the increase of Malay labour 
participation, especially at the supervisory and executive levels) and the expansion of 
tertiary education opportunities for Malays were also established in order to address the 
imbalanced ethnic profile of the unemployed. The establishment of the Free Trade 
Zones (FTZs) of 1971 in which the firms would have special support from the 
government played a significant role in increasing the employment of the Malays (Rajah 
Rasiah 1996: 136).  
The Social Security Act of 1969 was legislated in order to improve the basic 
livelihood of workers of the low-waged sector. Under this law employees earning below 
a specific amount should be registered and contribute to a fund called SOSCO 
regardless of their employment contract types. This would provide employees with such 
benefits as invalidity pensions, invalidity grants, survivors pensions, rehabilitation 
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benefits, funeral benefits, constant attendance allowance and educational loans. The 
employers paid on average 1.75% of the wage for the Employment Injury Insurance 
Scheme and the Invalidity Pension Scheme while the employee paid 0.5% of their wages 
to the fund for the Invalidity Pension Scheme. In 1971 the Social Security Organisation 
(PERKESO, Pertubuhan Keselmantan Sosial) was established to implement this system. 
It was a system designed to protect the low waged Malays’ income security since the 
Malays accounted for the majority of workers of the low waged sector.  
Table 3. Changes in Employment Structure by Ethnicity 
 1970 1990 Target  1990 Achieved 
Sectoral Employment  % % % 
Malays    
Agriculture 66.2  37.4  29.0 
Secondly  12.1  26.8 30.5  
Services 21.7  35.8 40.5  
Non-Malays    
Agriculture 33.5  27.1  14.0 
Secondly  28.7  28.7  39.5  
Services 37.8 44.2  46.5  
Source: Malaysia, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (1991: tables 2–7) Quoted with a 
modification in Rasiah, 1997, 128. 
The NEP, reflecting the strong will of the government to protect job security for the 
Malays, achieved a certain degree of success. The incidence of poverty for Malays 
reduced dramatically from 74% in 1970 to 23.8% in 19909 . The change in the Malays’ 
employment structure was equally remarkable. 
However the improvement in the racial imbalance of the employment is only one 
side of the story. The NEP had another goal, the rectification of the imbalance of 
ownership and wealth among the races. The programmes to achieve this goal 
consequently reduced the employment-generating capacity of the NEP. Ideas to rectify 
the distribution of ownership and wealth had been consistently demanded by the Malay 
capitalists. In 1965, when the Malay capitalists publicly demanded an increase in Malay 
participation in terms of capital share, the government established a Kongres Ekonomi 
Bumiputra in order to establish a detailed plan to meet the demands of the Malay 
capitalists. The target share of 30 per cent Malay ownership was demanded by the Malay 
                                                 
9 The poverty of Chinese and Indians was also reduced. The incidence of poverty for Chinese was 
reduced from 26% in 1970 to 5.5% in 1990  and Indians from 39% in 1970 to 8.0% in 1990. Rajah 
Rasiah (1997) «Class, Ethnicity and Economic Development in Malaysia», in Garry Rodan et al. (eds): 
The Political Economy of South-East Asia. An Introduction . Melbourne: Oxford University Press: 127. 
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capitalists (Shamsul 1991: 191). In the NEP this demand was translated into explicit 
programmes to support the activities of private Malay capitalists through public finance 
and the establishment of quasi-governmental bodies such as the Urban Development 
Authority (UDA) and the State Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) to 
promote the interests of the Malay capitalists. The corruption-ridden local political 
parties contributed to the increase of Malay capitalists’ ownership of enterprises, but the 
fund for the development project which would have been used to create jobs was not 
used properly1 0  .  
Another major element of the NEP was a shift of the industrialisation plan from ISI 
to EOI. In fact this policy shift had already begun when the 1968 Investment Incentives 
Act was legislated to encourage the expansion of manufactured export goods. Following 
the proposal by the Raja Mohar Committee for diversification into new industries, the 
Act included a wide range of support for export-oriented industries from tax relief for 
export-oriented firms, investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, 
export incentives, tariff protection for new manufacturing establishments to exemption 
from import duties and surtaxes. The government agency, the Federal Industrial 
Development Authority (FIDA), established in 1965, actively engaged in developing 
such industries. 
Under these circumstances the Labour Utilisation Relief Act was established in July 
1971. It was to grant tax relief to companies based on the number of workers employed 
and by the abolition of the 2 per-cent payroll tax so as to encourage labour-intensive 
industries. A racial quota for Malays was applied to this. This policy achieved a certain 
degree of success in increasing Malay employment. During 1970–1980, 1,414,100 new 
jobs were created on the Malaysian Peninsular and these were reasonably well allocated 
according to the racial composition of the population with 51.9 % of jobs for Malays, 
36.4 % for Chinese and 11.3 % for Indians. The increase of Malay employment in new 
or pioneer industries such as manufacturing and commerce industries was so remarkable 
that the share of Malay employment in the non-agricultural sector increased from 38% 
in 1970 to 43.7 % in 1980 (Mehmet 1982: 983).  
However it was a limited success in two senses1 1 . Despite the increase in Malay 
employment, the overall unemployment rate was not significantly improved and stood 
at 7 % in 1973. Secondly, most of the Malay employees in the commercial and industrial 
sector were in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, which were vulnerable to economic 
change. Several factors may explain why Malays took the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. 
Firstly, Malay youths’ preferences of arts, language and Islamic studies to science and 
techniques in secondly and higher education would not help them to get skilled jobs. 
                                                 
10 As for the corruption benefiting politicians, bureaucrats and Malay, Chinese and Indian contractors at both local 
and national level, see Shamsul 1983.  
11 David Lim (1982–1983) also raised a question about the result. He argued that the Labour Utilisation 
Relief itself was not significant in increasing employment since it was biased towards the bigger 
enterprises which were only 6% of the total number of manufacturing establishments and mostly 
capital-intensive. David Lim (1982–1983) «Malaysian Development Planning», Pacific Affairs, 55 (4): 
613–639. 
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Although the quota for admission for Malays played a significant role in increasing the 
degree of educational attainment of Malays, most Malays did not choose the science and 
technique related disciplines which were helpful in getting jobs as skilled workers and 
managers. Secondly, the provision of jobs in public service played a negative role in 
Malays’ getting jobs in the commercial and industrial sectors. The quota for Malays, 
relatively easy promotion and Malay-oriented working environment in the public sector 
facilitated highly educated Malays to choose jobs in the public sector rather than the 
private sector (Mehden 1975: 257). The guarantee of job security of Malays in the public 
sector prevented any increase in Malay employment at skilled and managerial jobs in the 
private sector.  
Despite the government efforts to improve the living standard of Malays through 
various programmes of the NEP, the economic imbalance between Malays and non-
Malays was not significantly improved until the late 1970s. The poverty was particularly 
severe for rural Malays, except for a small minority group of rural Indians (Kusnic and 
DaVanzo 1982: 31). The poverty in urban areas was not addressed with appropriate 
policies, either. Although there was a project to build 13,244 housing units for the urban 
poor between 1970 and 1975, this was not enough to make a significant improvement in 
the standard of living of the urban poor.  
Reform under the Mahatir  Government:  
From the Government-led Pro -Malays To 
the Government -led Al l  Malaysian Pol icy 
In the early 1980s Malaysia began to suffer from the international recession and the 
collapse of the commodity prices. The manufacturing industries showed a poor 
performance due mainly to a recession in the global semiconductor industry and partly 
to Malaysia’s relatively weak competitiveness in technology. The performance of the 
manufacturing sector was particularly poor in 1985. Real manufacturing ouput in 1985 
dropped by over 3 % and manufacturing exports were lower in 1985 than in 1984 
(World Bank 1989: 17).  
This recession was exacerbated by the capital flight. From the mid-1980s the outflow 
of capital increased and the Malaysian economy, relying heavily on foreign capital, 
entered a great crisis. Fierce competition between manufacturing firms, in particular 
knitting, semiconductor and telecommunication firms in FTZs, which had collectively 
contributed more than half of the employment generated in Malaysia’s FTZs, led them 
to accelerate the capital-intensification (Rasiah 1996: 123–4). Unemployment increased 
and the level of real wages declined. In 1986, real GDP was at about the same level as 
that of 1984 and the unemployment rate reached 8.2 percent, with about 450,000 
unemployed in 1986 (Ariff and Semudram 1987: 25).  
Apart from the increase in the unemployment rate, this short-run recession brought 
about a significant change in the labour market affecting various dimensions of workers’ 
security. There was an increase in casual or temporary labour and contract labour. 
Responding to the fluctuating market, companies replaced regular-full time workers 
with casual or temporary workers. Although casual or temporary employment patterns 
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already existed in the wood products industry, they became prevalent in all industries. 
By so doing, they could «by-pass (not evade)» regulations about regular workers 
imposed on employers and other institutional ‘rigidities’ such as collective agreements 
(Standing 1996: 65). Contract labour was spreading for the same reason. Although these 
contracted workers were in a less precarious position than casual or temporary workers 
in terms of income, they were in the same position in terms of employment security 
loss. The absence of clauses to protect the rights of such workers as temporary or part-
time workers and the insufficient number of labour laws enforcing officers contributed 
to further spreading of this kind of employment pattern (Standing 1996: 66).  
This change in employment patterns meant more than job loss to workers, since 
basic welfare benefits were tied to employment, that is, regular full-time employment. 
Under this circumstance, unemployment meant the loss of employment-related welfare 
benefits as well as income. Employers felt less pressure to adapt to technological 
change, since most production work was fragmented into contract labour. This also 
consequently resulted in the loss of skills which would be the basis of their trade 
security. 
Facing the urgent need to recover the economy Dr Mahatir’s government which 
replaced Hussein Onn as PM due to the latter’s poor health in July 1981, responded to 
this with a new approach composed of both old and new policies. The policy to increase 
Malay ownership continued. Despite the recession Mahatir affirmed that the 30 % of 
wealth ownership by Bumiputera would remain unchanged. Policy emphasis on the 
increase in Malay employment was not changed either.  
However the approach taken shows a significant difference from the predecessors in 
the field of employment policy and industrialisation strategy. Based on the policy called 
«Look East Policy» which emphasised the developmental models of Japan and South 
Korea (Machado 1987: 640–3), the Malaysian government set forth heavy 
industrialisation and urbanisation with an emphasis on the change of values and 
attitudes of the Malays. The government vigorously pursued such projects as the 
establishment of a hot briquetted iron and steel billet plant, cement plants, the national 
car project and small engine plants through the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM), the governmental commanding headquarter of the heavy 
industrialisation project. However these heavy industrialisation projects faced stiff 
international competition due to the excessive global production capacity and protective 
measures. Consequently the overcapacity of these projects had a negative effect on the 
Malaysian economy. It raised the production costs and consumer prices. Since 
investment in the heavy industrialisation project was mostly financed from external 
foreign borrowing, the burden of the external debt of the Federal government 
increased. The federal governments’ external debt grew from 10 percent of the GDP in 
1980 to 38 percent in 1986 (Ministry of Finance, Economic Report  1981, 1989).  
Urbanisation strategy encouraged the migration of the rural Malays and their 
participation in the government work projects in urban areas (Mahatir 1970: 113–4). 
The government projects were not big enough to accommodate the migrant rural 
Malays, and the pulling effect of this urbanisation strategy consequently contributed to 
an increase in unemployment in urban areas.  
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The Look East Policy contained the intention of the government to withdraw from 
the provision of finance to education and vocational training to Bumiputera. In line with 
this, on-the-job training rather than the government job training provision was 
emphasised. Although the government established many educational courses in 
business, commerce, science and technical and related fields, it gradually relied on 
overseas funding, mainly from Japan. The government also made transfer of technology 
a condition of contract or joint ventures by foreign companies. One of the main 
changes in the vocational training field was the establishment of training programmes 
paid for by foreign companies doing business in Malaysia (Mochado 1987: 652–3). The 
intention to reduce the current account deficit was another reason for this regulation. 
Foreign funded exchange programmes, a precondition of contracts or joint ventures, no 
doubt contributed to the reduction of the current account deficit of Malaysia which had 
the largest number of government-funded students seeking degrees abroad. 
Another major component of the Look East Policy was to privatise government-
owned companies. Although the privatisation initiative under the market-oriented 
reform was implemented without encroaching on Bumiputera’s economic interests, the 
benefits were not for the poor or the unemployed but for newly emerging Malays 
capitalists and politicians and bureaucrats who received kick-backs from those who 
benefited from the privatisation initiatives. 
In sum, as Mahatir confessed in an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
the unstated implication of this Look East Policy was that the Malays’ economic 
weakness could not be overcome by government aid, but by their own help. The 
government would only give them whatever necessary help it could afford. This was a 
change from the government-led to government-induced employment increase of 
Malays (Interview with FEER, October 30, 1981, 33, Machado 1987: 645). The 
government began to transfer its responsibility for employment and job training for 
Malays to the market during this period.  
The Look East Policy, lacking an explicit affirmative action for Malays, did not 
achieve its proposed goal in terms of economic growth and Malay employment until 
19871 2 , which resulted in a serious political challenge to Dr Mahatir. Accusing the 
leadership of blatant abuse of power, an authoritarian leadership style, economic 
mismanagement and patronage and corruption, the opposition factions whose main 
figures are Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah and Datuk Musa Hitam challenged the leadership 
of Dr Mahatir in the UMNO election for the top party posts in April 1987.  
The internal dispute of the UNMO opened a window of opportunity to enhance the 
position in the coalition to other component parties, especially the MCA (Malaysian 
Chinese Association). By pledging loyalty and support to the Mahatir government, the 
MCA forced Mahatir to move further away from the previous explicit Malay affirmative 
policy. Managing to maintain the pa rty leadership by a narrow margin, Mahatir 
                                                 
12 Despite a modest growth of 2.5 % and an increase in exports of 6%, the economy was not in good 
shape in 1987. High national debt, domestic demand and investment were down, and unemployment, 
particularly among Malays, was up to 9.5 %. Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysia in 1987. Decline of «The Malay 
Way» Asian Survey, Vol. 28, Issue 2. A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II, 213–222. p.220 
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responded to this political challenge by employing more blatant authoritarian-style 
suppression against his political opposition within the UNMO and reinforcing the 
coalition with other ethnic parties.  
From 1988 the Malaysian economy gradually recovered from the recession. The 
annual GDP growth reached 9.8% and unemployment was relatively low, at 6% in 1990. 
The twenty-year-old NEP came to an end in 1991 and its successor, the ten-year New 
Development Policy (NDP) was launched. This was, in a sense, a turning point in 
economic management, since it downplayed the question of racial quota in employment. 
It meant that the government would not play a direct role in improving the living 
standard of Malays.  
The privatisation initiative continued, as Proton (the state-owned automobile 
company) was partly privatised and the government’s sponsorship of the Malays’ 
privileges was gradually reduced (Case 1993b: 191).  
 The recovering economy resulted in a shortage of workers. The unemployment rate 
stood at about 3 % during the first half of the 1990s and the shortage of labour force in 
low-waged and unskilled jobs, such as labourers in the construction industry, was met 
by the influx of migrant workers from neighbouring countries such as Indonesia. The 
number of foreign workers increased from 0.5 million workers in 1984 to over 1.2 
million in 1991 and 2.4 million in 1998. The construction industry sector, which had a 
lower wage level and worse working conditions than those of other sectors, heavily 
relied on foreign workers. According to Pillai (1992) 70% of the construction workforce 
were migrant workers in 1991 (Pillai 1992, Abdul-Aziz 2001: 3–4). The government 
policy to legalise the status of illegal migrant workers encouraged the migration of 
workers, and the number of migrant workers was close to one million, almost 1.4 % of 
the total employment of 7.4 million in 1993. The shortage of skilled workers still 
remained the main problem.  
Since 1994, increased confidence in the continuous economic growth has led the 
government to resume massive public investment on education and training by 
allocating 20.6% of the 1995 budget, the largest share ever, for education and training in 
1994 (Jawhar bin Hassan 1995: 187). It has also launched several massive public projects 
including building low- and medium low-cost housing programmes called the Rumah 
Rakyat (people’s homes) and a new federal administrative centre (Putrajaya project). The 
expansionary budget and massive scale public works project had a positive effect on the 
employment rate, which remained less than 3 %; almost full employment. The only 
concern was a serious deficit in the current account, the highest in Asia, at an estimated 
9% of the GNP (Jawhar bin Hassan 1996: 124). It was almost a return to government-
led employment policies but with less of a pro-Malay element.  
During this period the Mahatir government gradually replaced the government-led 
pro-Malay employment policy with a government-led all Malaysian employment policy. 
Unemployment problems were addressed with a past strategy of generating jobs 
through industrialisation, particularly through the invitation of foreign direct investment. 
Although there was a significant improvement in the Malays’ employment in the 
modern sector, Malays still lagged behind others in terms of standard of living.  
The policy of pursuing job security through government investment was not 
supplemented by other welfare policies such as a universal old-aged pension system or 
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unemployment benefit system. Although public health care provision based on a 
universal welfare model provided health care services to people of both urban and rural 
areas, the government consistently manifested its intention to privatise the  health care 
system in such forms as savings, private insurance and employer-funded private 
coverage (Barraclough 1998: 57–58).  
Financial  Cris is  and the Pol icy Response 
to Unemployment  
Until 1997, when the Asian Financial crisis began, the Malaysian economy was on a 
sound footing with nearly full employment, price stability and high growth, the average 
rate being 8.7% during 1990–1997 (World Bank 2001, table 11, 210). Although the 
impact of the crisis on Malaysia was less severe than on Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea, the abrupt Asian financial crisis, and in particular the short-term capital outflow, 
certainly had damaging economic consequences on Malaysia. The stock price fell by 
68.6% and the dollar-ringgit exchange rate plunged by over 37% during the worst patch 
of about a year (Hasan 2000–2001: 39). The real GDP experienced negative growth of –
6.7 % in 1998 compared to  7.7% positive growth in 1997 (Malaysia 1999). 
Unemployment increased from 2.4 % to 3.2 % in 1998, which implies that the 
impact of the Financial Crisis on the employment was less severe than that of the 
recession of the mid-1980s, resulting in an unemployment rate of almost 8%. One 
Malaysia-specific factor may explain this low unemployment just after the Financial 
Crisis. The rural areas were not severely affected by the financial crisis. In fact some 
areas such as Sarawak and Sabah producing primary commodities such as palm oil 
priced in US dollars, benefited from the financial crisis (Embong 2000: 137). These rural 
areas played a buffer role in absorbing the returned workers from the urban area1 3 .  
Although the figure was not especially high, however, it may be wrong to take the 
unemployment rate at face value because it does not reflect dropouts or discouraged 
worker from the labour force (ADB 2000: 18). This is the case for Malaysia, which is a 
country with an agricultural sector large enough to absorb these discouraged workers.  
The unemployment in the construction sector, of which the government’s public 
works project accounted for the majority, was particularly severe, together with the 
manufacturing sector. The Malaysian government policy response to the unemployment 
was composed of two contradicting policies. The government tightened the monetary 
and fiscal policy and postponed large scale infrastructure projects totalling more than 
RM 60 billion; the Bakun hydro-electric dam, the Northern Region International 
Airport, the Highland Highway and the Kuala Lumpur Linear City were all postponed 
under government austerity measures. Civil servants’ pay was cut as the public 
expenditure was curtailed. This led to the reduction of some allowances to employees 
                                                 
13 The increase in number of the employed in occupational group 6 (agriculture, animal husbandly and 
forestry workers, fishermen and hunters) from 1,516, 4000 in 1997 to 1,632,600 partly confirms this 
argument. See table 4. 
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since the civil service pay was considered as an implicit income guideline. All these 
measures had a negative effect on the labour market so a countermeasure to the 
increasing unemployment was desperately needed.  
Another sector the government tackled to reduce the possible increase in 
unemployment was the migrant workers from neighbouring countries such as 
Indonesia. Before the financial crisis when Malaysia maintained near full employment, 
Malaysians moved into better-paying jobs while 2 million foreign workers, both 
documented and undocumented, filled low-end and unskilled jobs (so called 3D (dirty, 
difficult and dangerous) jobs) (Battistella and Asis 1998: 108–9). In 1998 the Malaysian 
government decided to repatriate about 900,000 documented migrant workers, mostly 
Indonesian. There were some 200,000 workers who were likely to be laid off in late 
1998, mostly in construction, and some 700,000 whose work permits would expire in 
August 1998  (Battistella and Asis 1998: 109). Given the portion of the total labour 
force of foreign migrant workers, the repatriation of these must have significantly 
contributed to reducing unemployment policy14. The effect of this repatriation policy 
was partly confirmed by the size of the reduction in employment of Group 7 in table 4, 
the production and related workers, transport equipment operators and labourers. The 
fact that the amount of laid-off workers totalled only about 150,000 jobs in these groups 
shows that the repatriation of 900,000 migrant workers mostly working in these 
occupations certainly contributed to reducing the damaging effect of the financial crisis 
on the labour market. 
                                                 
14 Although there is no available research on the effect of migrant workers on the reduction of 
unemployment, it is commonly pointed out that the repatriation of foreign workers contributed to the 
maintenance of low unemployment. See Embong, 2000, 137. Abdul Rahman Embong (2000) «The 
Political Dimension of the Economic Crisis in Malaysia», in Abdul Rahman Embong and Jürgen 
Rudolph (eds): Southeast Asia into the 21st Century: Crisis and Beyond. Pattani: Pernerbit Univeriti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia. 
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Table 4. Employment by Occupation in Malaysia (1995–2000) 
Occupational group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 756.6 838 896.6 913.1 937 985.1 
2 247.7 298.2 329.5 346.2 348.3 371.3 
3 832 905.8 963.2 946.9 985.6 990 
4 834.9 935.7 918.5 937.5 991.7 1050.8 
5 845.8 943.1 985.1 1007.9 1052.8 1149.9 
6 1539.5 1644.8 1516.4 1632.6 1633.1 1713.3 
7 2588.4 2833.6 2960 2815.4 2889.3 3061.3 
Total 7644.9 8399.2 8569.3 8599.6 8837.8 9321.7 
Note. ISCO1968. (1 (Major group 0/1): Professional, technical and related workers, 2 (Major group 2): 
Administrative and managerial workers, 3 (Major group 3): Clerical and related workers, 4 (Major group 
4): Sales workers, 5 (Major group 5): Service workers, 6 (Major group 6) : Agriculture, animal husbandly 
and forestry workers, fishermen and hunters, 7 (Major group 7/8/9) : Production and related workers, 
transport equipment operators and labourers. 
 
The Mahatir government’s policy response to unemployment was not fundamentally 
changed from the previous years. The Policy focus on job security was maintained at the 
expense of the migrant workers. The government pursued the policy focusing on 
Malaysian job security by getting rid of the job security of migrant workers. The 
Malaysian economy quickly bounced back from the financial crisis in the region with a 
surging growth of 8.3 % in 2000 and the Malaysian job security oriented policy reduced 
the pressure of unemployment. Through exploitation of the ethnically divided labour 
Figure1. Employment by Occupation in Malaysia 
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market at the expense of the migrant workers’ job security, the Malaysian government 
was able to manage the unemployment problems caused by the financial crisis.  
The future of the unemployed in Malaysia, however, does not look promising. The 
government’s effort to secure job security through general macro-economic 
management is in conflict with the relaxation of employment rules and regulations 
which consequently makes the labour market more flexible. The increase in casual and 
temporary workers leads to their exposure to a higher risk of job loss. Despite the 
increase of jobs in construction under the government’s recently resumed large scale 
works projects, the increasing migrant workers will reduce job opportunities for 
Malaysians and contribute to the lowering of real wages. The competition with migrant 
workers will result in a significant degree of income loss without government policy 
efforts to set the minimum wage.  
Since 2000 the government has begun to shift its focus to information technology 
and has established various government funded vocational training schemes, such as the 
Revolving Fund for Skill Development in which high school graduates can study 
information technology, at an estimated cost of 500 million ringgit (131.58 million 
dollars) (Xinhua News Agency, 5th of October, 2000). The intention was also reflected 
in the K-Economy Plan in September 2002. According to the plan the Malaysian 
government is to shift its economy from production-based (the so called P-Economy) 
to knowledge-based (the so called K-Economy), an economy dependent on brain rather 
than brawn, driven by mental rather than manual labour, more propelled by knowledge 
than by physical production (Sopiee 2002). Despite the government’s pledge not to 
dismantle or neglect the «old» industry, this high-skill and information-technology 
oriented job training is not readily available to those marginalized workers who are 
mostly low-skilled and uneducated Malays. Specific policy measures are urgently needed 
to guarantee their job and income security.  
The recent welfare reform trend is another factor to make the future of the 
unemployed seem bleak. As the government began to concentrate on non-inflationary 
financial resources for economic growth as well as social protection, (YB Datuk Dr 
Fong Chan Onn 2000), the contribution rate of both employers and employees to the 
provident fund has increased to 12 % and 11% of employees’ monthly wage 
respectively. The government’s intention to privatise public health care by making the 
employees reliant on the provident fund is more likely to increase the contribution rate 
of the provident fund, which will lead to income loss in the short term and increased 
unemployment in the long term. Without comprehensive policies to guarantee both 
income and job security, next time Malaysia may not have the luck which they had in the 
Asian financial crisis. 
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South Korea 
Korean War and Welfare Experiment  
Korea suffered Japanese colonialism for 36 years from 1910 to 1945 when Japanese 
surrendered to Western Allies. Korea, a predominantly agrarian economy based on 
paddy rice growing until the late 19 th century, began to make a socio-economic 
development during the colonial period. Having relatively scare natural resources 
endowed the economic structure did not go through fundamental change during the 
early phase of the colonial rule. It was the 1930s when Japan began to embark on its 
military expansion on China that the massive scale of industrialisation began in Korea. 
Since Japan decided to use Korean peninsular as a munitions factory for the northern 
front in China, the basic infrastructure such as railway expanded and both light and 
heavy industries began to develop.  
The end of the Second World War brought in another war to Korea, this time 
between the North and South, divided along the line of two polar powers of the world, 
the communist block and the west. Three years of  Korean War (1950–1953) had a 
tremendous impact on the political and socio-economic conditions of South Korea. 
Much of the progress made towards reconstruction between 1947 and 1949 was 
undone. 
The damage to the industrial sector was particularly severe during the war. In 1953, it 
was estimated that the net commodity product per capita in real terms was about 27 per 
cent less than that in 1946 (Kim & Romer 1979: 29, 35). After the Korean War 
enterprises suffered from a lack of capital for investment and there were few 
independent, private sources of help except foreign aid from the United Nations and 
the United States. Despite the difficulties of the industrial sector, thanks to the 
agricultural sector and foreign aid, the annual per capita product rose steadily 
throughout the 1950s . 
The effect of the growth of agricultural production was, however, mitigated by the 
increase in population. Population growth reached an average annual rate of nearly 2.9 
per cent during the second half of the 1950s. The influx of 1.8 million North Koreans 
during the Korean War contributed to the growing population and brought increased 
unemployment and a shortage of consumer goods and housing (Office of Labour 
Affairs 1973: 196). 
The first elected government could make a progress in terms of economic 
development with the foreign aid mostly from the US. In April 1960, students and 
intellectuals rose up against the Rhee government, and their nation-wide demonstration 
brought about the downfall of the regime (Han 1974, Cumings 1997: 339–47).  
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Table 5. The Frequency of Change in Cabinet Ministers 
 
The Rhee Government  
(1948–1960) 
The Chang Government 
(1960–1961) 
Military Junta 
(1961–1963) 
 
Duration 
(Months) 
Incumbents  
(Persons) 
Duration 
(Months) 
Incumbents  
(Persons) 
Duration 
(Months) 
Incumbents  
(Persons) 
Prime Minister 17 6 9 1 7 3 
Foreign Affairs 50 2 9 1 10 2 
Home Affairs 7 15 2 5 10 2 
Finance 17 6 9 1 5 4 
Justice 14 7 5 2 10 2 
Education 25 4 5 2 7 3 
Defence 20 5 5 2 10 2 
Agriculture 8 12 9 1 19 1 
Commerce and 
Industry 11 9 5 2 10 2 
Transportation 17 6 5 2 19 1 
Communication 20 5 3 3 19 1 
Public Health 50 2 n.a.  n.a.  
Social Affairs* 30 3 3 3 10 2 
Reconstruction 25 4 3 3 19 1 
Construction 0 0 0 0 7 3 
Mean 22 - 6 - 12 - 
* The Ministries of Public Health and Social Affairs were consolidated under the Chang Government. 
Source: Kim, C. I. E (1964) «Japan’s Colonial Education and Korea’s Nation Building», in C. I. E  Kim 
(ed.): A Pattern of Political Development. Korea. Seoul: The Korea Research and Publication: II–37. 
Chang Myon, newly elected Prime Minister took over power. The Chang government 
set «economic growth first (Kyongje Cheilchuui)» as the goal they would pursue 
throughout their term (Lee 1999: 18, 34–45). The government designed the Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan and asked the U.S. for financial support.  
Apart from the launch of the economic development programmes the 
unemployment and the expected spring shortage of foods, however, were the urgent 
issues for the government to address (Oh 1968: 83). In response to the unemployment 
and poverty the Chang government launched a first initiative of the massive scale public 
works projects. The policy choice for the public works projects for the unemployment 
policy is closely related to the Chang government’s instability.  
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The Chang government was unstable due to both internal factional strife and 
footloose people’s demands for rapid policy response to counteract the poverty. 
Although the unified Democratic Party took over power after the collapse of the Rhee 
regime, the unity of the party was not based on a positive belief in democratic 
programmes but on opposition to the Rhee regime (Henderson 1968: 304). Their 
marriage of convenience began to disintegrate and the Chang government suffered from 
consistent factional strife. The opposition faction within the party had always offered a 
different opinion on almost any government policy. The government had to constantly 
reshuffle its cabinet in order to satisfy its own opposition. Despite all efforts, the 
opposition group became increasingly hostile towards the government and finally the 
ruling Democratic Party was split up (Han 1974: 58–65, Lee 1968: 136–43). 
This factional strife hampered the government capacity to make and implement 
policies. It was much more visible in the ministries which had direct responsibility for 
labour and welfare issues (Yi 2002: 98–101). Table 5 shows the unstable nature of the 
Chang government in terms of governmental organisation. The organisational instability 
is reflected in the frequent changes in cabinet posts, and the duration of the ministers of 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Reconstruction is the 
shortest compared with others. The instability of the ministries which took in charge of 
policies to address the unemployment problems prevented the establishment of a 
systematic programmes responding to the unemployment. In addition, urgent political 
needs of the government to stabilise the people full of discontents and being impatient 
prevented the government from contemplating and designing a long-term economic 
development plan. Facing the increase of the unemployed people1 5  and the expected 
spring shortage of food the government established the public works projects to 
counteract the unemployment (Oh 1968: 83).  
The National Construction Plan was announced on 28 November 1960 and 
launched on 1 March 1961. On 2 February 1961 the United States announced an 
increase in aid in the form of surplus agricultural products which would go directly to 
Koreans employed on these projects as wages in kind (Reeve 1963: 146). The 
government appropriated a total of 43,001 million Korean Hwan which was 6.56 per 
cent of its budget (the Editorial Committee of the 40 Years’ History of Korean Public 
Finance 1990: 395–400, 420). 
The government drew up the National Construction Plan which aimed to achieve 
two goals. Firstly, to provide an infrastructure for industrialisation by building power 
plants, roads and dams and, secondly, to provide jobs for the unemployed. The main 
targets were the university graduates who had been the most politically activated.  
The Political aim of the National Construction Plan seemed to achieve  a certain 
degree of success thanks to support from within and outside the nation. When large-
scale recruitment of university graduates for these projects was announced, there were 
over ten thousand university student applicants.  
                                                 
15 Unemployment in 1960s was estimated at one-fifth of the total labour force or some two million 
people, and it was well beyond the capacity of the industrial sector to provide jobs. 
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It was no more than a hassle-free way to circumvent a complicated negotiation 
process with the opposition parties for resource allocation and policy design since it was 
to be mainly funded by the ear-marked US aids. It was also expected to enable the 
government to claim the «political credit» and contribute to calming down the social 
disorder since it would provide jobs to university graduates who had been considered as 
one of the most politically mobilised social forces. The limitation of both the 
governmental administrative capacity and financial resources led the government to 
choose public works projects mainly aiming at the university students, funded by the US 
aid as a programme to address the unemployment. In fact this programme contributed 
to reducing demonstrations in universities and stabilising social disorder (Lee 1999: 23–
4). However the public works projects were suddenly disrupted by the coup in 1961 by 
General Park in 1961. 
Economic Development and the 
Establ ishment of  Workers’ Welfa re State  
While the Chang government began to implement its policies to address economic and 
social problems, the streets were filled with all sorts of demonstrations and protests. 
The government’s economic policy had not yet brought about any visible achievements. 
All this caused even the supporters of the Chang government to think that the society 
was on the brink of collapse, and that they needed a stronger authority than the present 
Chang government to address social insecurity (Chang 1961: 34). 
It was General Chung Hee Park and a dozen or so colonels who responded to this 
social atmosphere with the military coup d’état of 16 May 1961. By 17 May, a military 
junta had gained operational control of the ROK army, forcefully dissolved the National 
Assembly, banned all political activity, and begun to control bureaucrats through the 
newly appointed heads of ministries who were all military officers.  
Due to the urgent political needs to justify their unconstitutional take-over of the 
power, the military junta also put the priority on the policy to address the wide-spread 
poverty and the increasing unemployed people in the urban areas1 6 . On 18 July 1961, 
just two months after the coup, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 
announced the Emergent Economic Policy which promulgated that the government 
would continue the public works project to reduce unemployment, followed by the 
establishment of the Livelihood Protection Programme (LPP) to alleviate the poverty in 
December 1961.  
Although the political urgency played a significant role in establishing those 
programmes the policy response of the military junta (the Park government since 1963) 
                                                 
16 Increasing unemployment was particularly serious in urban areas, which had resulted in severe poverty. 
In August 1962, of the 9.8 million economically active population, 0.7 million were unemployed (the 
Editorial Committee of the History of Korean Military Revolution 1963b: 510–1). Since the survey 
included people working more than 12 hours per week (20 days per three months) in the category of 
the employed, the number of the unemployed was underestimated. The unemployment rate in urban 
areas was four times bigger than that of rural areas in 1963 (the Economic Planning Board 1971: 48). 
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to the unemployment and poverty was much more systematic than the previous 
government for several reasons. Firstly the idea of the top-decision maker, Coup leader 
Park who became the President in 1963 shaped the nature of the programme. Park 
emphasised the self-reliance and the work ethic as a way to escape the poverty. He was 
at the heart of the all the decision making processes and his ideas brought about a new 
social policy paradigm specifying how social problems should be identified and which 
goals should be attained through policy (Yi 2002: 105–107). Secondly, as the members 
of the military junta took charge of all the governmental institutions the institutional 
cohesiveness was drastically enhanced. Maintaining the administrative staffs and 
hierarchy of the previous government contributed to strengthening the administrative 
cohesiveness. Thirdly the administrative efficiency in the dimension of decision-making 
was drastically improved by the establishment of the hierarchical administrative 
structure where the economic-growth-goal-oriented policy makers, mostly those in the 
Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of 
Treasury had the final decision-making power over other ministries whose policies were 
purpose-centred rather than the economic growth centred (Chung 1989). These 
economic bureaucrats «formulated a broad industrial policy, identify means to 
implement it and ensure competition in strategic sectors» (Woo-Cummings 1999: 14). 
They were able to coordinate competing policies generated from a long-term economic 
development plan and a short-term social and political demands generated by 
international and domestic factors. This developmental administrative structure 
continued during both periods of the Park and Chun governments at least and the 
economic planning bureaucracies such as the Economic Planning Board which put the 
priority on the economic growth in a consistent manner maintained the power to 
control over a wide range of policy issues during the period. Fourthly, as the state 
governments successfully established and strengthened credit-based systems of 
industrialisation through financial control over bank loans, interest rates and etc., the 
‘developmental coalition’ where the government played a role of planner and the firms a 
role of implementer was established. Based on this coalition the government could exert 
an influence on the role of firms in redistribution areas as well as distribution areas (Yi 
2002). 
With the enhanced institutional cohesiveness and administrative capacity the military 
junta established the public assistance programme, called the Livelihood Protection 
Programme (LPP) in December 1961 to respond to the wide-spread poverty. Although 
established to respond to wide-spread poverty and discontent from the poor by 
alleviating the extreme poverty Park ’s concern for the lack of government resources and 
the emphasis on the work principle led the government to establish a strict eligibility 
criteria by which the poor with working capacity were excluded from the benefit 
coverage. The first criteria which the military junta established included only those 
below 18 and over 65 years of ages, pregnant women and disabled men who had no 
relatives or families. The eligibility criteria did not have an explicit official poverty line or 
income and asset criteria for the recipients. The income and asset criteria for the 
recipients were to be decided by the Minister of the Public Health and Social Affairs. 
Under the circumstance the eligibility criteria established by the Ministry of Public 
Health and Social Welfare, which was believed to expand the coverage of the 
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programme was frequently rejected and lowered than the suggested level by the 
Economic Planning Board (Chon 1992: 77). Together with the imposition of the family 
responsibility and the emphasis on the work principle by the government the Economic 
Planning Board which played a veto point in the expansion of the LPP coverage 
facilitated the the exclusion of the able-bodied poor from the benefits recipients.  
The unemployed who were left outside of this programme were suffering from a lack 
of basic food and clothing. In order to respond to these problems the military junta 
expanded the coverage of the LPP to the able-bodied poor categorised as «People living 
in poverty (Yongsemin)» in 1962. However work principle was again emphasised and 
the junta assigned them to public works projects under the re-launched National 
Construction Projects.  
Since 1964 the government have developed a wide range of works projects and the 
main focus was placed upon the irrigation works and land reclamation in order to 
provide the poor with the agricultural lands. For instance in 1966 82.8% of the 
participants in the public works projects were working for the irrigation works and land 
reclamation (the Government of Korea 1967: 465). The unemployed poor with working 
capacity in urban areas were largely excluded from the programme.  
The government established the recipient criteria in a very much arbitrary manner in 
which the ultimate decision was at the Economic Planning Board and a very small 
segment of people could receive benefits. Through this process the characteristics of 
LPP, the exclusion of the poor with working capacity and the emphasis on the work 
principle, were in large preserved during the period of the 1960s to the 1970s when 
Korea achieved a rapid economic growth and maintained low unemployment rate (see 
Table 6 and Figure 2) . 
In the early 1980s when Korean economy fell into recession the Chun government 
which took over the power through the coups in 1980 launched several initiatives for 
welfare programmes, which was used as a tool to strengthen their legitimacy. The 
revision of the LPP of 1982 was a part of this government’s initiatives to expand the 
welfare system. The revision brought about changes in two dimensions. Firstly, the 
government included the programme for education of the offspring of the recipients in 
the LPP. Although it certainly have contributed to increasing disposable income of the 
recipients, the benefits given in the form of exemption of the tuition fees focused on 
the employability development of the young dependents rather than the increase of the 
disposable income. 
The emphasis of the work principle and the relative neglect of the income security of 
the poor with working capacity were reflected in the reduction of the expenditure of the 
LPP. Table 7 shows that as the unemployment rate gradually decreased from 1982 the 
expenditure on the LPP was also significantly reduced compared to other welfare 
programmes. The reduction of relative share of the programme compared to other 
programmes was accentuated when the responsibility for the LPP implementation was 
transferred to the local government in 1992. Tight budget of the local government 
obstructed the development of the programme as a public assistance programme for the 
unemployed. 
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Table 6. Unemployment Rate Between 1970 and 1996 
 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
Unemployment Rate 4.5  4.5  4.1  3.9  3.2  5.2  4.4  3.8 3.8 2.5  2.4  2.4 2.4  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Unemployment Rate 
Between 1970 and 1996
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Table 7. The Government Expenditures on Welfare Programmes in Korea 
 1970 1980 1985 1990 1991 
Social 
Insurance 
14.4 45.3 403.3 53.8 1,280.4 68.3 4,040.7 74.0 4,969.3 74.3 
The LPP 4.7 14.8 119.7 15.9 174.0 9.3 341.2 6.3 278.1 4.2 
Medicaid - - 14.2 1.9 65.9 3.5 151.4 2.8 173.0 2.6 
Public Health 3.2 10.1 71.1 9.5 102.5 5.5 216.7 4.0 330.8 4.9 
Public 
Housing 2.5 7.8 71.1 9.5 44.3 2.4 226.5 4.1 264.1 4.0 
Veterans 
Relief 6.5 20.4 61.8 8.2 158.3 8.4 366.7 6.7 527.4 7.9 
Others 0.5 1.6 9.1 1.2 49.4 2.6 114.8 2.1 142.1 2.1 
Total 31.8 100 750.3 100 1,874.8 100 5,458.0 100 6,684.8 100 
Total as 
Percentage 
of GNP 
1.15 2.04 2.40 3.18 3.24 
Source: Korea Development Institute, National Budget and Policy Goals, various issues. Ministry of Home 
Affairs, Financial Yearbook of Local Government, various issues Ministry of Fianance, Summary of 
Financial Implementation for Fiscal Year various issues. Quoted from Kwon 1993 . 
In sum the combination of the government’s emphasis on the work principle with the 
absence of explicit criteria for the poor resulted in the exclusion of the poor but able-
bodied unemployed people from the programme. The LPP launched as a public 
assistance programme to provide benefits to both the poor and the unemployed was 
gradually transformed into the public assistance to the poor incapable of working. 
According to the government’s survey, 80% of the recipients of the LPP were the 
disabled, the elderly or children who were incapable of working (the Ministry of 
Government Administration 1997: 111). Since the LPP excluded the able-bodied 
unemployed from the coverage, the living standard of those working poor was entirely 
dependent upon the market’s capacity to generate jobs. In this sense the LPP was a very 
much job-security oriented programme.  
In contrast with the LPP the governments’ policy efforts for skill development was 
remarkable during the period of the Park government.  
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While suppressing the trade union activities and labour movement, the governments 
established a wide range of policies to increase and facilitate the welfare and skills 
development of workers1 7 .  
The economic development plans first launched in 1962 and renewed every five 
years played a fundamental role in shaping the nature of vocational training. At the 
initial stage, mindful of the country’s limited natural resources and small domestic 
market, the Park government adopted an outward-looking development strategy that 
emphasised export expansion. In the 1960s, the essence of this strategy was the 
promotion of export-oriented industrialisation, mainly labour-intensive light industries 
such as textiles, plywood and shoes. There were certain requisites for the success of 
these industries; a cheap but well-trained labour force and financial resources to be 
invested in this industry. Therefore, social welfare programmes should also conform to 
this industrialisation strategy and this strategy in most cases delayed the development of 
welfare programmes except for in two fields; vocational training and occupa tional 
welfare for workers. 
In order to create a cheap but well-trained labour force, the government invested in 
the training of technicians and skilled workers who would ensure the success of the 
First Five-Year Economic Development Plan. In 1964 an unprecedented subsidy of 
131,470,000 won was granted for the purchase of laboratory and testing equipment and 
the expansion of on-the-job training facilities in engineering, agriculture, fisheries and 
other «trade» schools. Vocational training institutes were established at 13 companies 
with suitable facilities for on-the-job training and experiments. In March 1964: 749 
certified technicians graduated, with 37 classes and 956 trainees enrolled. The 
investment in vocational education was accelerated in 1965 after President Park visited 
West Germany. He was very impressed by vocational education there, and in particular 
by the fact that most German companies had their own schools for vocational 
education. In a speech following his visit to West Germany, he expressed his strong 
wish to establish similar institutes of vocational education (Shin 1970: 23–4) and in 1965 
the government appropriated an additional 342,310,000 won for vocational education in 
high schools. 
In 1967 the government legislated the Vocational Training Act and began to launch 
public vocational training courses to provide skilled workers and technicians to 
industries. Together with the emphasis on general education to reduce illiteracy and 
innumeracy through formal education, the government intended to enhance the skills of 
operatives and craftsmen through the establishment of public vocational training 
institutions such as the Central Vocational Training Centre established in 1968. In this 
initial period the government assumed both financial and managerial responsibility for 
vocational training. Given the government’s strong role of regulator rather than 
                                                 
17 Social insurance programmes such as the Industrial Accident Insurance Programmes, the National Health 
Insurance Programmes and the National Pension Programmes were established and expanded their coverage to 
more workers gradually in a piecemeal fashion. Because of managerial reasons and financial feasibility the 
government targeted the workers employed at a certain size of establishments.  
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provider in other social welfare programmes during this period, the government’s 
assuming both regulator’s and provider’s roles in the vocational training field was 
noticeable. The private industries did not have an interest in investing in skills 
developments and the government even subsidised the in-house training of private 
companies (Bai and Cho 1994: 49–50).  
As the Korean economy entered the «deepening stage» of industrialisation where the 
heavy and chemical industries began to emerge after 1972 the demand for skilled 
manpower from the industry drastically increased, but the public vocational training 
institutions could not meet these demands (Bai and Cho: 50–52). The government 
transfered the responsibility for the supply of skilled workers by establishing the Special 
Measure Act for Vocational Training of 1974 and the Basic Law for Vocational Training 
of 1976. It is worth paying attention to the year of 1974 when the Special Measure Act 
for Vocational Training was legislated. In 1974 the government postponed all the 
programmes which would place financial burdens on the firms to overcome the 
difficulties caused by the oil crisis which hit Korea hard in October 1973. While the 
government tried to reduce all the other welfare programmes which would put financial 
burden on firms (Yi 2002: 161), it established a special measure to oblige firms to do 
vocational training for their employees. It shows that the economic ministries perceived 
vocational training as a solution to overcome economic difficulties in the short-run and 
to achieve long-term economic development. This shows that the economic-growth 
goal-driven policy makers facilitated the reinforcement of the employment dimension of 
the security even under the economic crisis by establishing compulsory vocational 
training schemes for firms. Both laws enforced the in-plant training of a certain 
percentage of employees on private companies. Under the Basic Law for Vocational 
Training of 1976 the firms had two options: in-plant training and contributions to 
public vocational training schemes. Since the students enrolled in the public vocational 
training institutions were mostly young first-time job seekers such as middle school 
graduates, high school drop-outs or high school graduates, the Law enforced the firms 
to contribute to either human capital investment for their own employees or human 
capital investment for job seekers, which enhanced their chance to get a job. Therefore 
the Law itself had a focus on two dimensions of security, that is, employment security 
through the increase in the human capital of workers and job security through the skills 
development of the first-time job seekers. For firms, retraining and upgrading the skills 
of their own employees was much safer and more economical than contributing to the 
public vocational training over which firms had no control. Until 1982 when the heavy 
and chemical industries were suffering from over capacity due to the international 
recession, the number of craftsman trainees by in-plant training schemes was much 
higher than those by public institutions and authorised (both quasi-public and private) 
institutions (See Figure 2). 
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Source: Economic Planning Board, Mining and Manufacturing Census, various issues, quoted from Bai and 
Cho, 1994. 
After a brief period of decline in the number of trainees of in-plant vocational training, 
this re-increased from the late 1980s when the Korean economy regained its strength. 
The government’s enforcement of the compulsory in-plant vocational training on the 
private companies became strengthened and enlarged as the coverage of the Law 
expanded. In 1992 the Law expanded its coverage to firms with more than 150 
employees. The government’s policy for vocational training focused on both the job and 
employment dimensions of the unemployed and workers’ security. As the government 
began to shift its focus from vocational training for first time job seekers to retraining of 
workers employed at private firms by establishing a series of laws forcing private 
companies to establish compulsory in-plant vocational training, it became a policy to 
facilitate the human capital of workers, which in consequence strengthened the 
employment dimension of the security. 
Structural  Adjustment and the Relaxation 
of the In -Plant Vocational  Training 
Obl igation.  
The Yushin regime ended suddenly when President Park was assassinated by the chief of 
his security guards. The Fifth Republic (1980–1988) headed by Chun, the-ex General 
dominating the unstable political scene of the early 1980s by using his military force was 
launched. It set out two national goals: Stabilising the economy and building a welfare 
state. Setting out «the Construction of a Welfare State» as a national goal was perceived 
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as a particularly noticeable breakaway from the previous government, which had 
emphasised an expansionary economic policy to promote exports and «economic 
growth first and distribution later». The previous government considered the welfare 
state a distant goal and encouraged people to improve their welfare through hard work 
rather than rely on government redistribution.  
President Chun pledged that he would address the inequalities which had arisen 
during the late 1970s by paying greater attention to issues of social development. The 
term «welfare state» gained common currency. Several welfare initiatives made the new 
government appear committed to building a welfare state. Government expenditure on 
social security and welfare appeared to increase.  
Economic problems had been hotly debated in the previous government from late 
1978, when there was a visible sign of an overheated economy and high inflation due to 
the government’s expansionary economic policy to develop the heavy and chemical 
industries. The consumer price index jumped from 10.1 per cent in 1977 to 14. 4 per 
cent in 1978 and 18.3 per cent in 1979 and export performance was deteriorating. From 
March 1978 to June 1979, the government’s counter measures fluctuated between 
stabilization and expansionary measures due to the internal disputes between economic 
bureaucrats, and the economy was getting worse due to the deteriorated export 
performance (Haggard & Collins 1994: 59–64).  
Upon seizing office in May 1980, General Chun and his economic advisors made 
curbing inflation the top priority of the government’s economic policy. However, they 
also had to address a severe recession and rising unemployment caused by the 
deteriorating export performance in order to attract political support.  
As it turned out, it was a policy to overcome recession rather than high inflation on 
which the government landed. It increased large public works and housing projects to 
address the unemployment problem. Strong tax-reduction measures were taken, 
targeting low-income workers despite the loss of revenue. The budget deficit increased 
from 1.4 per cent of the GNP in 1979 to 3.2 per cent in 1980 (Haggard & Collins 1994: 
82). The government, however, did not legislate or implement any significant 
government-financed welfare policies.  
The policy direction to overcome recession was also shown in the macro-economic 
policies for business. Interest rates were lowered and the Won devalued. A series of 
government policies to boost the economy, such as the Economic Counter-measure of 
14 January 1982, the Economic Measure of 18 May 1982 and the Counter-measure To 
Boost Investment of 28 June 1982, were focused on reducing the financial burden on 
companies by reducing taxes and relaxing conditions of bank loans. These contributed 
to improved export competitiveness. The imposition of the in-plant training was also 
relaxed.  
By the end of 1982, the Korean economy showed strong signs of recovery. Despite 
the expansionary economic policy of the government, inflation had fallen. The 
government, however, still felt an urgent necessity of stabilization policy due to several 
economic problems. One of the most serious problems was the debt which had grown 
from 20.3 billion US dollars in 1979 to 37.1 billion US dollars in 1982.  
In April 1984 the government issued a revised version of the Fifth Economic and 
Social Development Five-Year Plan for the years 1981 to 1986, emphasizing inflation 
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stabilization, increasing exports and savings, and a reduction of external debt. The plan 
embodied three basic tasks which the Chun government would pursue; to cut the 
government deficit, limit monetary growth, and reduce the wage-increase rate. Among 
these tasks, price stabilisation was put at the top of the list (Suh 1992: 26).  
The government froze its budget for 1984 in order to show its strong intention to 
stabilise prices. It reduced the total government deficit as a percentage of GNP from 4.7 
per cent in 1981 to 1.4 per cent in 1984.  
In addition, the government reduced credit growth to the private sector. The main 
targets were the policy loans to the heavy and chemical industries. The government also 
eliminated most interest-rate subsidies to heavy and chemical industries. Consequently, 
the ratio of preferential policy loans of total domestic credit was cut from 51 per cent in 
1978 to 40 per cent in 1984. This policy faced strong resistance from the business 
community which lost benefits derived from preferential loans and subsidised interest 
rates. 
One of the other main tools to stabilize prices was income policy. Since wage costs 
were the main portion of the total costs for final goods and services, curbing wage 
inflation was considered a prerequisite for containing price inflation. The wage restraint 
policy was especially persuasive because labour-intensive industries constituted a high 
proportion of Korea’s export industries (Kim C. 1994: 214).  
The wage freeze on workers in public enterprises in 1984 was a sign of the 
government’s strong commitment to the implementation of income policy. The 
government argued that the rapid real wage growth of the late 1970s, which outstripped 
productivity growth, was one of the critical causes of the country’s economic difficulties. 
In 1984, it tried to enforce private enterprises to follow the example of state-owned 
companies and the civil-service sector whose wage increase had been set by the 
government (Whang 1992: 318). It imposed a wage freeze on civil servants and military 
personnel and maintained the wage-increase rate of workers in public enterprises at 
below 5 per cent until 1987. In addition, the government used the state-owned banks as 
agents to control wage increases in private companies. The banks pressed their 
borrowers, mostly large firms, to reduce their debt-equity ratio to specific targets before 
granting wage raises (Haggard & Collins 1994: 89–90).   
The programmes to achieve the goal of «creation of a welfare state» set by the 
government were carried out under these circumstances. President Chun’s idea about 
the welfare state was not fundamentally different from that of the previous Park 
government’s. What made the Chun’s government welfare policy distinctive was that, 
due to its massive political propaganda, it had to show visible improvements in 
provision of social welfare.  
However, his way to build a welfare state was not much different from that of his 
predecessor. It still contained a developmental welfare perspective that welfare should 
be achieved through economic development (Kuznets 1994: 110).  
After the launch of the Fifth Republic, the size of the social welfare budget was 
increasing, but the size of social welfare spending against the government’s total 
spending was not much different from the previous government’s, apart from some 
periods in the 1970s (Table 8). 
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Table 8. Social Welfare Spending as % of Total Government Spending (%) 
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
% 2.56 2.28 3.98 3.62 3.34 3.06 2.97 3.35 2.84 1.92 2.4 1.55 1.57 1.14 
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987  
% 2.69 1.83 1.94 1.89 2.52 2.73 2.35 2.5 2.72 2.75 2.89 2.9 3.27  
Source : The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (1981, 1987, 1988) Health and Social Affairs, Kwach ’on, 
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 19, 483, 368 respectively. 
The Korean economy started to recover from late 1984. The inflation rate was reduced 
and the external balance was improved. In 1985, the government relaxed its strong 
policy to control inflation and began to expand credits for export, to increase credit 
lines to small- and medium-sized companies and to depreciate the value of the Won. 
This expansionary policy direction was reinforced in 1986 when Man-Je Kim, a 
supporter of the use of credit for industrial policy purposes, was appointed deputy 
prime minister and head of the Economic Planning Board. The policy change coincided 
with the drop of world oil prices and international interest rates. The Korean export 
sector responded quickly. Exports increased by 28 per cent in 1986. The economic 
recovery accelerated by the export boom continued until 1988.  
The Labour Market Flexibi l isation and the 
Employment Security 
Through the period of industrialisation one of the features in the Korean employment 
pattern was the tendency to retain workers even under the repression. Although the 
rapid economic growth was obviously one of the main reasons to make this possible, 
the governments’ subsidies to the firms in financial difficulty due to business fluctuation 
also played a significant role. Although merger and absorption occurred frequently, mass 
lay-off was not a common phenomenon. The government considered employment to 
be the most important way to enhance individual welfare, and both employers and 
employees expected that the government would help the companies to avoid lay-offs. 
Life-long employment was a widespread expectation and the social insurance 
programmes and occupational welfare provision, both of which were based on 
employment contracts, strengthened this belief.  
This employment pattern  began to be blamed for the dithering economy from the 
early 199os. The Korean economy showed a decline in terms of GDP growth of 4.5%, 
from 9.4 % in 1991 while the CPI increased to 6.2%. The Y.S. Kim government 
launched in 1992 drew up a new economic strategy called the New Economic Plan 
(Sinkyongche Chongchaek). This aimed to reinvigorate the declining economy under the  
increasing competition and the newly established international market environment by 
increasing the national competitiveness. 
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Figure 3. The Composition of the Employment Insurance 
 
The human capital development was one of the central concerns of the government.  
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flexibilisation were introduced within this context. The Employment Insurance was 
legislated in December 1993 and implemented from 1995 with 3.94 million members, 
32.5 % of the total employees. The EIS comprised three components, the employment 
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bureaucrats of the human resource development unit of the Economic Planning Board 
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disseminated to the participants of the policy-making process, including the delegates of 
the FKTU, the idea that the EI should be designed as a complementary element to the 
employment policies rather than as an unemployment insurance system (The Ministry of 
Labor 2001: 16–19).  
The inclusion of several activation elements to encourage the recipients to participate 
in the labour market reflected this policy orientation. For instance a claimant was 
required to register as a job seeker at a public employment office to receive 
unemployment benefit, and payment of benefits would be suspended for a few weeks if 
the claimant refused the job placement services or vocational training recommended by 
the public employment office, unless there were justifiable causes for the refusal.  
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The complementary role of the EI was re-emphasised during the decision-making 
process where the coverage of the programmes was dealt with. Despite the general 
consensus on the necessity of the EI, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the 
Ministry of Labour had different ideas over the financial burden of the companies 
incurred by the EIS. While the Ministry of Industry and Commerce was concerned with 
the financial burden of employers proposed for the coverage for companies with 150 or 
more, the Ministry of Labour covered companies with 10 or more, by which 4.9 million 
workers, 62.1 % of the total labour force would be covered (Chosun Daily 25th of June, 
1993). The two ministries’ competing proposals were compromised after a year-and-half 
long discussion as a result of which the unemployment benefit programme would cover 
the companies with 30 or more, i.e. 3.94 million workers, or 49.9 % of the total labour 
force, and the other programmes would focus on vocational training for reemployment, 
and the employment maintenance subsidies covered the companies with 70 or more 
employees (Chosun Daily 26 Nov. 1994). The feature of the income security protection 
was watered down through both the policy-making and implementation processes due 
to the strong role played by the economic bureaucrats. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the emphasis on the employment dimension of the 
EI did not contain the elements to force recipients to work as a compulsory 
requirement for the benefits, commonly known as the workfare approach (Lødemel and 
Dahl 2001). The government focused on job-matching services to provide information 
on jobs rather than on making punitive rules and regulations to link benefit eligibility to 
work. Participation in vocational training was not a requirement for the benefits either. 
Anyone who wanted to be trained would be free to participate in the training programs. 
The labour law reform to introduce measures of labour market flexibilisation such as 
numerical structural adjustment was fundamentally different from its predecessor in 
terms of the policy-making process. The rationale behind the labour law reform was that 
the labour market flexibilisation was a prerequisite for the enhancement of national 
competitiveness (Choi et al. 1999: 90). In order to reform the labour laws the 
government established the Labour Law Revision Committee (LLRC) composed of the 
three parties of the government, employers and trade unions in May 1996. The 
establishment of the LLRC represented a great change in the government’s attitude 
towards the labour movement since it included the representatives of the KCTU, the 
national-level trade union which was highly influential in the labour movement but not 
legally recognised. While recognising the influence of the KCTU on the labour force, 
the government also aimed to enhance the image of the first civilian democratic 
government through this initiative.  
The main goal of the government was very much economically oriented, which was 
to make both the pillar national trade unions of the FKTU and the KCTU agree to the 
measures of the labour market flexibilisation, such as the introduction of non-regular 
workers and the relaxation of the restrictions on hiring and firing, while the KCTU tried 
to use the opportunity to enhance their political status in and outside the formal political 
arenas. Their main agendas were political issues such as legalisation of multiple trade 
unionism and eradication of the restrictive rules on the trade union activities.  
After a 6-month long discussion at the LLRC, participants could not reach a 
consensus. The government would not accept the multiple unionism, which they 
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thought would increase the industrial disputes, while the KCTU would not accept the 
government measures about the labour market flexibilisation. As a result, the 
government forcefully passed the Reformed Labour Law which compromised on the 
conflicting ideas of the government, employers and trade unions. While introducing 
measures to flexibilise the labour market, it legally recognised the KCTU as the second 
national trade union but postponed multiple trade unionism at the enterprise level until 
2003. Although strong criticism was made by the trade unions and opposition parties 
against the contents of the bill, the main issue was not its contents, but the way the 
government and ruling party rammed the bill through parliament in a secret night 
session (Kim 1998). Both national level trade unions, the FKTU and the KCTU, waged 
general strikes from 26 December to 28 February 1997 and the government and trade 
unions collided in the street. Facing strong resistance from the labour force, the 
government made a new proposal for a labour law through consultation with the 
opposition parties in March 1997. Several restrictions on lay-off for managerial reasons 
were added to the new law, and its implementation was postponed to 2000. After a 
series of labour reform processes, it was the KCTU which gained the tangible result of 
legalisation. Despite the introduction of the measures of the labour market 
flexibilisation, employers would not fully resort to law because of the strengthened trade 
union power shown during the process of labour law reform. The government and 
employers failed to make the labour market flexible in such a way as to reduce the 
industrial disputes. The employment security was strengthened as the power of the trade 
unions increased.  
The labour market flexibilisation and the establishment of the Employment 
Insurance marked an important watershed in terms of the government’s policy response 
to unemployment. This showed that the democratic government began to pay attention 
to the income dimension of the unemployed, although there were still an emphasis on 
the employment and job dimension of the security. The failure to introduce the 
immediate measures to flexibilise the labour market could not reduce the employment 
dimension of the security.  
Korean Labour Marker Pol ic ies under the 
Economic Cr is is 
The Asian financial crisis spread to Korea in late 1997 and had a catastrophic effect on 
every aspect of Korean society. Between October and December 1997 the Korean Won 
was depreciated by 112 per cent against the US Dollar, while the stock of foreign 
exchange reserves was dropped from 22.3 billion to a mere 3.8 million US Dollars. The 
worst following the financial crisis was the collapse of more than 17,000 companies – 
including 8 Chaebol companies which had been highly praised as a locomotive of the 
rapid economic growth of South Korea. The unemployment rate, which was 2.6 percent 
in November 1997, increased to 8.6 per cent in February 1998 and the number of the 
unemployed went up from 0.5 million before the crisis to 1.8 million in February 1998. 
Taking into account of the fall of the participation rate by 1.5 %, the unemployment 
rate would have been much lower. It was such an unprecedented one that it was often 
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described as the «the worst disaster since the Tan’gun (the founding father of the 
Korean nation, 5000 years ago in the myth)». 
Table 9. Composition of Expenditures on EI by Programmes (thousand won) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Employment Stabilisation Programmes 19,835 110,873 197,501 125,671 
Employability Development Programmes 66,292 270,444 524,678 494,516 
Unemployment Benefits  83,254 808,775 946,141 479,423 
*Planning. Actual data is not available yet. Source: The Ministry of Labour (2001) «White Paper of 
Employment Insurance 2001», Kwachon: The Ministry of Labour: 261–262. 
The seismic effect of this crisis also brought about a great change in the labour market 
and the welfare system in Korea. The international organizations such as IMF which the 
Korean government relied on for financial rescue demanded the newly elected President 
Kim Dae Jung to immediately introduce several measures including labour market 
reform to facilitate the «redeployment of labour», that is, replacement of regular 
employees with non-regular workers and relaxation of lay-off clauses (Choi et al. 2000: 
352).  
 Although the government felt as much necessity for the flexible labour market as 
those of the international organizations and Korean employers, it could not implement 
those measures instantly because of the strong resistance from the labour. Industrial 
disputes caused by the implementation of those measures would have been detrimental 
to the Korean economy in the crisis. The government established a tripartite committee 
to persuade the labour of the necessity for the introduction of the lay-off clauses. The 
governments put such agenda as the guarantee for the political activities of the trade 
union within a year, the guarantee for the associational rights of civil servants and the 
expansion of the budgets for employment security and payment for trade union officials 
on the negotiation table in order to make a consensus on the labour market 
flexibilisation. On 7th of February 1998, the compromise was made between the 
government, employers and trade unions and the several measures for labour market 
flexibilisation were introduced. The two national trade unions, the Federation of Korea 
Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions, accepted the 
establishment of 7 trillion Korean won budget for programmes for the unemployed, 
associational rights for civil servants and teachers, the guarantee for the laid-off workers 
to join the trade union above the enterprise level and the guarantee for the political 
activities of trade unions in return for the acceptance for the labour market 
flexibilisation measures.  
Although the agreement on the introduction of the measures for labour market 
flexibilisation weakened employment security of workers, the elements to protect 
employment security still remained. Firstly, the reformed labour law contained an 
obligation of employers to apply fair standards in selecting employees for dismissal and 
to consult with trade unions or employees’ representative organizations in order to 
establish a fair and reasonable selection criteria for the lay-offs. The employers should 
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give a 60-day notice prior to planned dismissal for managerial reasons. And they were 
required to offer call-back obligation to those laid-off workers. Secondly, the production 
workers in the manufacturing sector should not be laid off. Thirdly, the criteria, period 
and reasons for hiring dispatched workers replacing the regular workers should be 
explicitly explained to trade unions and the period of temporary hiring for dispatched 
workers was limited to less than three months. These elements together with the 
presence of the obligation to pay a severance pay to laid-off workers constrained the 
firms’ managerial rights during the numerical adjustment process (OECD 2000: 63).  
Realising the fact that the magnitude of the unemployment was bigger than they had 
expected, the government established several policy measures to counteract the 
unemployment under the Committee for Unemployment Measures chaired by the 
Prime Minister in the early 1998.  
The major policy measures were a large scale public works projects, the reform of the 
public assistance programmes and the rapid expansion of the coverage of the 
Employment Insurance Programme.  
The rapid expansion of the coverage of the Employment Insurance (EI) was 
particularly remarkable given the gradual and patched-work pattern of expansion of 
other social insurance programmes. Responding to the increasing unemployment the 
government expanded the coverage to firms of 10 workers or more in January 1998, to 
firms of 5 or more in March 1998, and to all firms irrespective of their sizes. This rapid 
expansion of the coverage was reflected in the dramatic increase in the expenditure of 
the EI (See table 9)  
Although it cannot be denied that the expansion of the coverage of the EI played a 
significant role in reducing the pain and sufferings of the unemployed in general, some 
built-in components in the system resulted in the exclusion of workers from the benefits 
of the coverage expansion. First of all, despite the expansion of the coverage of the EI, 
most non-regular workers working less than 18 hours or 80 hours a month, daily 
workers with a contract less than one month and workers over 65 years of age and new 
employees over 60 years of age were not covered by the EI due to the eligibility criteria 
which excluded those non-regular workers. The exclusion of the non-regular workers 
from the EI coverage was particularly serious since the workers under these categories 
accounted for more than half of the total paid employees in 1999 and they were the 
most-likely victims of mass lay-off. Secondly, the take-up rate of benefits to the 
unemployed was very low. It was estimated that in 1999 only 12.5% of total 
unemployed was registered as Job Seeking Allowance (Korean version of 
unemployment benefits without work requirement) recipients. The eligibility criteria of 
six-month-contribution record and the failure of the contribution from the employer 
side resulted in such a low take-up rate. The victims of the failure to pay contribution 
were mostly workers of the small and medium sized companies whose degree of 
compliance to social insurance programmes as well as other regulations were relatively 
low. Thirdly, since the benefit level was indexed to the recipients’ average income, the 
recipients with a lower average income suffered from the low income replacement rate. 
The majority of recipients had been low-waged workers and their job seeking 
allowances were set below the minimum wage which had already long been criticized for 
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its impracticably low amount. The exclusionary feature of the EI and low replacement 
rate of the system played a role in forcing the unemployed to look for a job (Park 1999).  
 
 
 
As the coverage expanded, the expenditure on all three programmes of the EI 
dramatically increased. The composition of the share of each programme, however, also 
changed. The figure shows that although the share of the expenditure on the income 
dimension still accounted for a significant part of the total expenditure, it became 
smaller as the unemployment rate decreased while the share of expenditure on those 
programmes for employment and job securities larger. Although it is beyond our 
concern the exact effects of each programmes on the reduction of the unemployment, it 
is certain that the pushing force of the limited coverage and the pulling power from the 
increase in the expenditure on the programmes for the employment and job securities 
must have contributed to forcing the unemployed to re-enter and stay in the labour 
market.  
Another major unemployment policy measure of the Kim government was the 
National Basic Livelihood Programme established in 1999. Until it was established, the 
public works projects and the Livelihood Protection  Programme (LPP) were mainly 
used to counteract the unemployment problem and the poverty.  
The public works projects had been mostly carried out within Seoul area whose local 
government was more financially affordable for the projects after 1994 when the 
financial responsibility for public works projects were transferred to local governments 
(Abrahart 2001: 87). Realising that the magnitude of the unemployment was bigger than 
expected the government increased public works projects in urban areas from March 
1998 and it became the programme on which the government spent the largest amount 
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of its budgets amongst the programmes addressing the unemployment in 1998 (See 
table 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Human Resource Development of Korea (2000) Yearly Statistics of Employment Insurance, Seoul, 
RDK. 
Table 10. Expenditure on the Livelihood Protection for the Unemployed in 1998 By Programme 
(100 million won) 
Total  Public Works Projects Unemployment Benefits Loans to the Unemployed Assistance for Living Costs 
30,346 9,252 8,050 7,1543 5,891 
Source : the Ministry of Labour (1999) 1999 Detailed Project Plan for Comprehensive Unemployment 
Countermeasures, Kwachon, The Ministry of Labour. 
About 80% of beneficiaries of the Livelihood Protection Programme were those living 
outside Seoul before the Financial Crisis since people in Seoul   whose housing had a 
relatively high value did not meet the asset criteria of the LPP. In June 1999 the 
President Kim proclaimed the Establishment of the Productive Welfare System as one 
of national goals and announced that the government would propose a bill for the 
National Basic Livelihood Protection (NBLP) Law which would replace the Livelihood 
Protection Programme. The purpose of the NBLP programme was to guarantee the 
basic living standard of the people in poverty (The Assessment Committee of the 
National Basic Living Protection System 2001: 9). In order to fulfil the purpose the 
government established the eligibility criteria which was more inclusive than that of the 
LPP. Firstly, the income and asset criteria of the NBLP was relaxed compared to the 
previous LPP and people with housing in urban areas could also be included. Secondly, 
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the family responsibility criteria was also relaxed and the government did not account 
for the income and asset of brothers and sisters not living with the applicants for the 
benefits. In spite of these improvements the eligibility criteria was still exclusive due to 
its low income criteria. The income level to qualify for the benefits was so low that only 
3% of the total population could qualify for the benefits while the estimated poverty 
rate was 7–8%. (The Assessment Group for the National Basic Livelihood System, the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare 2001: 9–10, 13).  
 The system also has a built-in element to address the unemployment problem such as 
conditional living allowance and self-help allowance in order to encourage the recipients 
to work. In July 2001, 350,000 out of total 1.51 million recipients of the NBLP were 
those with physical working capacity and 221,000 out of them had jobs (The 
Assessment Group for the National Basic Livelihood System, the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 2001: 151). The governments assessed the conditions of 129,000 
unemployed recipients with physical working capacity and selected 61,000 recipients as 
the conditional recipients who were required to participate in the work or educational 
programme in return for the living allowances. In other words about 80% of recipients 
with working capacity were either workers or those under works projects and 
educational programmes. The meagre benefits and the work requirement for these able-
bodied recipients reflect the Kim government’s strong emphasis on the «productive 
welfare».  
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Conclusion 
Korea and Malaysia have maintained decades of low unemployment compared to other 
parts of the world. The Asian Financial Crisis, however, disrupted the highly praised 
economic growth and the low unemployment. Changes in global economic 
environment such as increases in capital and labour mobility and the structural changes 
from manufacturing to service and new information technology exacerbated the 
unemployment problem in these countries. Demands for security for the unemployed 
were increasing and governments of these countries had to respond to the demand with 
appropriate policies.  
It is not necessarily true, however, that there had not been policy measures to 
counteract the unemployment in these two countries before the Financial Crisis. The 
low rates of unemployment during the industrialisation process indirectly shows that 
there must have been a systematic policy effort to counteract the unemployment 
problems. 
In order to find out how developing countries without a comprehensive 
unemployment benefits system have coped with the unemployment problems, we 
established a explanatory framework for the analysis of the unemployment policies, 
called the recipient-centred approach. The framework offered several advantages in the 
analysis of the unemployment policies in clarifying the meanings of the widely used 
concepts such as welfare-to-work, workfare and both active and passive labour market 
policies. It also enables us to analyse unemployment policies within a much broader 
range of policy fields and thus bring the countries without specific unemployment 
benefit programmes into the field of social policy studies.  
Since 1957 the Malaysian government consistently pursued the employment policies 
emphasising the security of job and employment dimensions. The large public sector 
and the political power of Malays provided the Malaysian government with a leverage to 
create jobs in the public sector and increase employment of Malays.  
Since the early 1980s when the political solidarity of Malays became weakened and 
Malaysian economy became more dependent upon the foreign investors the Malaysian 
government’s employment policies changed from government-led employment and job 
securities-oriented policies for Malays to the government-induced market-oriented 
employment and job-security-oriented policies for Malaysians. Job creation through the 
invitation of the foreign capital and the development of on-the-job training were the 
major policy measures of the Malaysian labour market policies. The welfare programmes 
protecting the income dimension of the security were not developed in proper. 
The impact of the Financial Crisis on the labour market was much more serious than 
what the year-end statistics revealed. As the economy plunged into the recession, the 
Malaysian government either cancelled or postponed large-scale construction projects. 
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In order to counteract the consequential large unemployment, Malaysian government 
carried out a massive scale of repatriation of migrant workers. It was those migrant 
workers who were mainly victimised during the Crisis and the Malaysian government 
could maintain the relatively low unemployment rate at the expense of the loss of job 
security of these migrant workers.  
After the Financial Crisis the government’s economic strategy emphasising the 
information technology affected its employment policies. Education and the job training 
for highly educated university graduates and high skilled workers were emphasised by 
the government. The government policy is changing from the protection of job security 
of Malays to that of Malaysians, and from the policy for the majority of the population 
to a very small segment of society.  
Korea also had consistently pursued the job security dimension through the 
government-led industrialisation. Frequent legitimacy crisis led the government to 
launch public works projects for job creation. The governments’ control over the 
private businesses made it possible for the government to compel the private business 
to engage in a massive scale vocational training programmes. The governments’ 
employment polices were mainly determined by both the political and economic needs. 
The ministries in charge of macro-economic management played a role of veto point in 
the development of income security and the governments’ unemployment policy was 
designed to protect the dimensions of employment and job securities.  
Although there have been a development of social insurance system, those 
programmes were highly employment-related system and the welfare programmes for 
the unemployed were very much meagre. The governments’ unemployment policies 
together with their welfare framework have been focusing on workers’ welfare rather 
than the welfare of the unemployed. This pattern of social insurance system continued 
in the Employment Insurance established in 1995. The major recipients of the system 
were regular workers working at relatively large sized companies.  
The damage caused by the Financial Crisis to the Korean labour market was severe. 
The unemployment rate increased to the unprecedented level and the demands for the 
security of the unemployed gained a public support. The coverage of the EI was rapidly 
expanded to virtually all firms and the public assistance programme, called the National 
Basic Livelihood Protection Programme was established under the slogan of the 
«productive welfare». Despite the enhancement of the protection for the income 
security dimension by the expansion and the establishment of these programmes, the 
employment policy pattern emphasising the employment and job security dimension still 
remained in the design and the implementation of the programmes. The programme 
components of the EI focusing on the employment and job security dimension become 
larger as the unemployment rate decreased and the low coverage and the modest level 
of the benefits of the NBLP forced the recipients to work.  
Both countries with strong authority and power resources showed several similarities 
in the operation of the unemployment policies. First, the emphasis on the job and 
employment security rather than income is found in both countries. Although Korea is 
considered to be different from Malaysia given its newly established and expanded EI 
system which had a component securing income dimension, the increasing share of the 
programmes on job and employment dimensions shows a policy similarity to that of 
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Malaysia. Secondly, in both countries governments have employed private business for 
the government employment policies. The governments of these countries employed 
the private sector to create jobs, secure employment of certain segment of people and to 
force the companies to do vocational trainings according to the government’s economic 
development plan.  
The trajectory of the unemployment policy development of these two countries, 
however, appears to be diverging rather than converging. Although it is yet too early to 
judge the success or failure of unemployment policy after the financial crisis, the 
Malaysian government seems to pursue the employment security for small segment of 
the labour force, that is, highly educated and skilled while the Korean government for 
much bigger segment of the labour force, the regular workers. In addition the Korean 
governments’ attention to income dimension of the EI seems to be a significant factor 
distinguishing the trajectory of Korean welfare state development from that of 
Malaysian.  
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